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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
MARCH 25, 2015

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Introduction

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about U.S. countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) programs.

I have the privilege of serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control (TRAC). In this capacity, I am the principal advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) for all TRAC matters.

I oversee the implementation of the DoD CTR Program, executed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is the U.S. Government's most comprehensive tool to prevent WMD risks from becoming concrete threats to the security of the United States and our allies. I also manage the Department's treaty implementation activities to ensure all DoD activities fully comply with arms control agreements, including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and preparations for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). I oversee the elimination of the United States' chemical weapons stockpile, ensuring maximum protection to the workforce, the public, and the environment, while also meeting CWC obligations. I am also responsible for efforts to develop and field a CWMD Situational Awareness capability for the DoD and its interagency and international partners.

My testimony focuses on our more recent successes and specific initiatives for the coming fiscal year to prepare for emerging threats across the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) spectrum and strengthen our ability to counter the WMD threats we face today. The President's FY16 budget requests a total \$358.1M for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency-executed CTR Program; \$720.7M for the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program and \$48.1 M for CWMD Systems.

Countering Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Threats

Our increasingly interconnected world makes WMD-related knowledge, materials, and technology more readily available to those who seek to harm the United States at home and our interests abroad.

The DoD Strategy for Countering WMD, published in June of 2014, delineates three end states: (1) no new actors obtain WMD; (2) those possessing WMD do not use them; and (3) if actors use WMD, their effects are minimized. The Department's strategic approach to achieve these end states is organized into the following lines of effort: Prevent Acquisition; Contain and Reduce Threats; and Respond to Crises. My office's combined nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and combatting weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) activities directly contribute to these efforts.

The following includes recent successes working with foreign partners to reduce the threat of WMD, as well as FY16 plans to eliminate existing WMD; make nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons more difficult to acquire; and enable foreign partners to detect and interdict

dangerous WMD components and materials on their own soil and waters before they can reach the United States.

Eliminating Chemical Threats

On August 18, 2014, the United States completed the destruction of the deadliest chemicals in Syria's declared stockpile. The DoD CTR Program worked across the Department and the U.S. Government, and with our international partners, to provide the capabilities necessary to eliminate the threat posed by Syria's chemical weapons program. Thanks to our dedicated civilian and military professionals, the destruction effort was completed under budget and weeks ahead of schedule.

The DoD CTR Program contributed significant resources, including equipment, destruction technology, and expertise, to this international elimination effort. To enable removal of the chemical stockpile from Syria, the CTR Program provided transport and material handling equipment, medical countermeasures, and packaging materials to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Mission. CTR also outfitted the Motor Vessel CAPE RAY, a U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet Vessel, with two specially-designed neutralization systems, along with all of the equipment, personnel, and expertise necessary to neutralize 600 tons of Sarin precursor chemicals and 20 tons of mustard blister agent in a safe and environmentally sound manner.

In FY16 and beyond, the DoD CTR Program will remain ready to rapidly eliminate other international chemical weapons stockpiles as opportunities emerge.

We continue to meet our commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention to eliminate the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Last week, we began destruction of the stockpile stored in Pueblo, Colorado using the U.S. Army's Explosive Destruction System. This system will be used to process problematic munitions that cannot be easily processed in the primary plant, which is expected to begin operations late this calendar year.

Countering the Biological Threats

Over the past year, the CTR Program has been instrumental in providing capacity to contain the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Its spread reminded us that deadly infectious diseases can pose biological threats to our nation's security, either by spreading through populations or through hostile activities of a non-state actor. The CTR Program has aspects that work to prevent both scenarios, through regular engagement with U.S. government and international partners.

To counter the Ebola threat in West Africa, the DoD CTR Program provided a range of capabilities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea—working collaboratively with the World Health Organization and U.S. interagency partners. The Program provided diagnostic laboratory capabilities to Liberia and Sierra Leone—in the form of equipment, personnel, logistical support, personal protective equipment (PPE), and supplies—which were essential for detecting and reporting new Ebola cases. The CTR Program also provided thousands of PPE sets to the affected countries, which enabled personnel on the front lines to perform crucial outbreak containment work, and assessed and built capacities related to a sample transport network in Liberia, which played an essential role in enabling the timely diagnosis of new cases throughout the country.

CTR's ability to respond effectively to this rapidly emerging security crisis—working in close coordination with DoD and interagency partners—has helped contain the biological threat posed by the Ebola epidemic. By taking action to rein in this epidemic with the potential for exponential growth, we have helped save thousands of lives and restore stability and security to the region

The fight against Ebola is part of a broader, international effort to counter biological threats. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSa) was officially launched in February 2014 to ensure countries have the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks before they evolve into the health, security, and economic threat we recently witnessed in West Africa. The CTR Program has contributed to the security elements of the GHSa and will leverage international commitments to GHSa to help propagate our biological threat reduction objectives with new partners to create new opportunities for collaborative threat reduction activities.

Looking forward to FY16, to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to dangerous pathogens that could be used in an attack and to prevent accidental release of dangerous pathogens, CTR will continue to work with partner countries to enhance laboratory security and safety. To strengthen preparedness for mitigating biological threats, CTR will support partner countries as they build linkages among the defense and security sectors, law enforcement, and health sectors and their use of early warning systems. CTR will also build biosurveillance capabilities, so biological threats—whether naturally emerging, deliberately spread, or accidentally released—are rapidly detected and contained before they reach U.S. shores.

Proliferation Prevention

Regional crises can also destabilize borders, leaving them vulnerable to WMD trafficking and the free movement of malicious non-state actors. It is critical to mitigate these threats by increasing partner countries' proliferation prevention capabilities and ability to maintain integrity and control of their borders.

The DoD CTR Program responded rapidly to Ukraine's border security and WMD proliferation vulnerabilities created as a result of the Russian Federation's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and aggressive actions to destabilize eastern Ukraine. The ongoing crisis spurred an influx of new border security personnel and changed Ukraine's border composition. The current insecure borders, coupled with the border guards' strained resources, create an environment that is ripe for increased WMD materials smuggling, even in areas far from Russian paramilitary activity, which enabled the team to identify gaps in Ukraine's ability to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of CBRN materials and provided equipment to meet those capability needs.

Russia's destabilization of its neighbors' sovereign borders has highlighted the threat that nuclear or other WMD-usable materials could make their way into the hands of malicious actors. The CTR Program is continuing to engage with Ukraine to enhance its proliferation prevention capabilities and its ability to maintain integrity and control of their borders.

To address this threat of WMD proliferation in the region more comprehensively, DoD will continue to build partners' CWMD capacity across Russia's periphery through FY16 and

beyond. The CTR Program had already been working through its long-standing partnerships with Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova to help to mitigate the risk of cross-border WMD movement. Continued support of DoD CTR helps ensure that the United States remains the partner of choice to combat WMD threats wherever they may exist.

The Middle East is also undergoing an emerging crisis precipitated by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); destabilized borders have exacerbated the threat that terrorists will exploit vulnerabilities to acquire, proliferate, and use WMD—making DoD threat reduction work even more crucial.

We will continue to work with several partners in the region to enhance their ability to secure their most dangerous materials, detect and interdict WMD materials and components, and mitigate the risks of possible chemical weapons use. For example, the DoD CTR Program will continue to work with regional partners to provide security enhancements along borders with Syria and Iraq. In Jordan, border surveillance systems provided by CTR are already contributing to enhanced CWMD operations and have helped Jordanians stop incursions into their country by terrorists and traffickers from regions with known WMD threats.

Reducing Nuclear Threats

I am here also to highlight DoD's efforts to raise barriers that ensure terrorists and state proliferators are denied access nuclear materials and expertise abroad. The combination of vulnerable nuclear materials, the global distribution of nuclear weapons, and non-state actors' seeking to acquire WMD capabilities present grave threats to U.S. security and the security of our allies.

Our office will continue to counter these threats by working with partner countries to help deter, detect, and identify potential proliferators. For example, the DoD is working within the U.S. Support Program to bolster the ability of the IAEA to implement Safeguards Agreements and provide technical support in the form of sample analysis for the IAEA as part of its Network of Analytical Laboratories. These efforts ensure that governments are held accountable for their nuclear materials and also work to deter and detect any potential diversion of nuclear material to offensive uses.

We also will support all U.S. verification activities under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, including installation, operation, and maintenance of U.S. International Monitoring System (IMS) stations. The IMS is the centerpiece of a unique, comprehensive verification regime to dissuade proliferators—monitoring the globe for the tell-tale signs of nuclear test explosions to ensure that no test goes undetected.

DoD is coordinating its efforts abroad with the Departments of Energy and State to reduce the availability and accessibility of weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide, to promote a culture of security, and to sustain robust interdiction efforts while ensuring the dangerous nuclear ambitions of state and non-state actors will remain difficult to realize. Our collaborative nuclear security efforts with interagency partners will help drive progress on nuclear security, and this will serve as a significant piece of the U.S. contribution to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

Increasing CWMD Situational Awareness

Our CWMD Systems portfolio is sponsoring development of a CWMD Situational Awareness capability for the Department and its interagency and international partners. Its mission is to provide a system that integrates, analyzes, and disseminates CWMD information. Its primary focus is on the development of a CWMD Situational Awareness prototype called Constellation, which is a common information environment that enables situational understanding and supports decision making. It will be a platform for sharing information across security domains, supporting various communities of interest, and leveraging emergent DoD and Intelligence Community technologies. It will provide information about the CWMD community's capabilities and authorities, adversary WMD networks and programs, proliferation activities, and dual-use technologies. Once operational, Constellation will present a dynamic, holistic view of the global CWMD operating environment that will allow us to anticipate and counter weapons of mass destruction more effectively.

Conclusion

A more interconnected world and technological advances have lowered barriers to both state and non-state adversaries seeking WMD-related expertise, materials, and technologies. This means DoD must develop agile programs to respond.

In the coming fiscal year TRAC will continue to oversee DTRA's implementation of the CTR Program, with a focus on rapid, agile response to current international security threats—such as those posed by ISIL, Ebola, and Russia's destabilizing activities in regions near its periphery—as well as proactively building capacity to prevent the emergence of new WMD threats. In FY16 we will help anticipate WMD threats by expanding capabilities to support information sharing, collaboration, planning, and decision-making. To meet U.S. treaty commitments, we will continue supporting the International Monitoring System, the International Atomic Energy Agency, fulfilling our obligations under the CWC and BWC, and continue destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile.

The Department is working to strengthen the capabilities of the United States to prevent, deter, defeat, and respond to these threats effectively. We ask that you approve the President's FY16 budget request so we can achieve these goals.

I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to testify today and would be pleased to answer your questions.