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**BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS  
FIRST SESSION, 113<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
ON  
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY**

**16 APRIL 2013**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on total Army readiness with my fellow panel members.

America's Army remains at war and has been in a state of continuous war for the past twelve years, the longest in our nation's history. More than 167,000 Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in nearly 160 countries worldwide. We serve as a total Army--Active, Army Reserve and National Guard—and deploy as a joint and combined force, serving side by side with Marines, Airmen and Sailors and coalition partners, all working to achieve one goal: to fight and win our nation's wars. After more than a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation and our Army are in a period of transition, a turning point characterized by a fiscally constrained environment and a global security environment that is more complex and uncertain than at any time since the end of World War II, pointing to further instability. The Army remains a key guardian of our national security. Our ability to provide a trained, ready and capable force to fulfill global commitments and mission requirements is predicated upon continued investment in readiness.

### **Current Readiness**

The Total Army (Active, Reserve and National Guard) conducts missions worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well as within the United States in support of civil authorities. This force provides the foundation for global security posture by engaging partners and dissuading adversaries. As the demands for Army forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease, the requirement for strategic landpower capable of worldwide deployment will endure.

The Army's Active, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers are currently committed to operations around the world – in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. The Army's ability to perform these vital missions is at risk due to sequestration, budget uncertainty and shortfalls in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. We cannot afford to allow the Total Army to fall behind in readiness or modernization; we must place our Soldiers in position for success by giving them the best leaders, training and equipment that the

Nation can afford. We must providing combatant commanders the most capable Soldiers and units possible to execute our national security goals. In other words, investment in our readiness is a strategic necessity. History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions for which our Army must be ready. The nation has paid a heavy price for its historic pattern of unpreparedness at the start of major conflicts; therefore, we must be prepared now and in the future to dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. Failure to do so can result in a “hollow” Army, dangerously unable to protect the nation’s interests, placing our national security at risk and threatening the readiness of our Soldiers. No level of risk is acceptable if it threatens the ability of our Soldiers to fight and survive in combat.

Maintaining an Army capable of performing its vital role of winning the nation's wars in an environment of budgetary uncertainty translates into significant readiness issues over the next several years for our military and civilian populations. The nation cannot afford to give up the readiness achieved since the events of September 11th. The Army faces dramatic cuts to its personnel, force structure and modernization programs. For the past twelve years, we have relied heavily on a combination of Active, Reserve and National Guard capabilities. Every year, an average of 24,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized and seamlessly integrated to support the total force. In addition, more than fifty percent of the National Guard Soldiers are veterans of a deployment, many having served multiple tours just as their active counterparts. Total force operational proficiency is inextricably linked to our operational Army Reserve and National Guard readiness. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard each have distinct roles and legal authorities and we believe maintaining these forces ensures the Total Army is well postured to meet both domestic and overseas mission requirements. Again, sequestration will tremendously impact the Total Army’s ability to fulfill the goals and objectives outlined in both the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities.

The Army is committed to balancing the current demands with a realistic strategy that ensures America’s dominance in military operations remains unchallenged and that our forces remain ready and relevant. Considering that the Total Army currently supports operations in approximately 160 countries around the world, the importance of

managing and mitigating these impacts and risks to readiness based on our responsibilities to execute current military strategy objectives is critical.

The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army remain committed to winning the current fight, sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, preparing trained and ready forces for a full range of operations and increasing future force capabilities based upon lessons learned from 12 years of war. To prepare for operations in a postwar environment based upon the current fiscal constraints, the Secretary of the Army and the CSA outlined steps they must take to reduce expenditures while mitigating risk to readiness.

### **Ready and Available Forces.**

**Future Force Generation.** Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) puts the Army on a rotational readiness cycle which enabled us to provide cohesive units to combatant commanders for enduring missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. ARFORGEN provides the mechanism to adjust training, equipping and manning of our units to meet the requirements of persistent conflict. Lessons learned from more than 12 years of war demonstrate the need for a force generation cycle built on a demand-based model rather than a supply-based model; we are in the final stages of developing a new Future Force Generation model that will realign our institutional systems to support this goal. However, the efficiency gained by the new model which will prioritize training for decisive action with a focus on combined arms maneuver and wide area security, will not solve all the problems that falling under certain budget levels will create. Future Force Generation will allow the Army to apply scarce resources and project manpower at the correct time and place to minimize risk, ensure readiness, specifically identifying those capabilities critical to meeting the National Military Strategy, allowing us to project steady-state requirements while retaining the capability and flexibility to surge for the most stressing war plan. The Army will focus resources only on those units deployed, deploying or with critical contingency response missions. The gap in readiness will be for those units associated with contingency

response to missions outside of the annual priorities identified by the joint staff with an acceptable level of risk for the nation.

**Regionally Aligned Forces.** Maintaining an Army capable of winning the nation's wars, even in an environment of budgetary uncertainty and reduced resources, is critical. To be more responsive to all combatant commanders and better enable our joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners, the Army is regionally-aligning its forces to provide rapidly deployable, tailored capabilities that are consistently available for all requirements. Regionally Aligned Forces are the Total Army Force. Regional alignment leverages the critical partnership and unique skills of the Army Reserve and National Guard, in combination with the ready capabilities of the Active Component. To assist in planning support for regionally-aligned missions, the Army Reserve is creating Army Reserve Engagement Cells at the Army Service Component Command. These cells will deliver critical planning and support, ensuring the unique combat support and combat service support capabilities of the Army Reserve are maintained and used.

Operational missions, operations support, theater security cooperation activities and bilateral and multilateral exercises are at risk due to the baseline training that focuses on combined arms maneuver and wide-area security which requires developing language skills, regional expertise and cultural training necessary for Soldiers to operate in combatant commanders' areas of responsibility. This training, which includes joint exercises and operations with partners and allies, is paramount to the CSA's vision of the Army's role in protecting American interests at home and abroad. Soldiers who receive regionally-specific training and equipment and participate in regionally-focused missions will contribute to the shaping of their regional security environments with much greater effectiveness. Adequate resources are required to ensure that as missions evolve and new threats emerge, aligned forces are trained, ready and tailored to support the mission as necessary.

**Training Readiness.** The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we can no longer accept increased levels of risk in how we train and prepare for war.

Training and leader development are focused on three strategic ends: training units to be versatile and ready to support combatant commanders worldwide; developing leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st Century; and holding commanders responsible for progressive and realistic training, guided by the doctrine of mission command. The Chief of Staff of the Army's immediate priority is to ensure Soldiers in Afghanistan and those next to deploy are trained and ready. Training for operational adaptability will take place at home station, combat training centers, in Army institutions and while deployed. Army leaders must recognize that there are no predetermined solutions to problems, so training and leader development must continue to foster creativity at every level. The Army's Force Generation process is central to future training readiness. The Army Reserve and National Guard will remain on a 60-month process, providing a cost-effective progressive readiness model. The Active Army Force Generation process is changing from a 36-month to a 24-month process leading the Army to change the timelines for conducting training.

The Army is also revitalizing home station training and the training management skills of commanders so they will be more effective and efficient in preparing units and Soldiers for the future. Similar to the pre-9/11 Army, our ability to execute demanding home station training will provide the strategic depth necessary for the Nation to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

This is essential given that non-deploying units will face the most direct impact of reduced resources. The Army will continue to prioritize efforts to maintain readiness across non-deployed forces according to the Secretary of Defense's Strategic Planning Guidance against these known requirements: Homeland Defense (HLD) units; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) units; Korean forward deployed units; the global response force (GRF); and other combatant command contingency response forces. Immediately and most profoundly, the vast majority of non-deploying Army units will train less often and to a lower level of proficiency. In addition, the Army may curtail the training of critical enablers, skills and functions. Some examples of the current effects of resource reductions on the Army's individual and collective training are:

- Curtailing training for 78% of all non-deploying or non-forward stationed units
- Cancelling five Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Brigade Warfighter Exercises (WFXs), and one Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Exercise

Our inability to train non-deploying units will degrade our units' readiness posture and reduce the progressive build of unit capability to meet early FY14 missions, emerging requirements and timelines associated with Combatant Commander war plans. These examples illustrate how curtailing training will impact our units' basic warfighting skills and create shortfalls across critical specialties including aviation, intelligence and engineering. Training shortfalls will also impact our ability to recruit new Soldiers into the Army.

Sequestration will have significant short and long term impacts on instructional capability, institutional training and certifications as a result of civilian furloughs. The impact will be felt across all 32 Army Schools organized under eight Centers of Excellence managed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the 18 Non-TRADOC Schools that execute branch specific training (Special Warfare, Medical and Judge Advocate General), component specific training (U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard), and specialty schools (Inspector General, Corps of Engineers, School of Music, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, etc.). Annually, these centers and schools train approximately 500,000 Soldiers, Civilians and other service members in initial military skill training, professional military education and functional duty specific training, to include Ranger and airborne qualification. The majority of these schools use Department of the Army (DA) Civilians as instructors; their absence one day a week will require training institutions to implement less than optimal alternatives. These alternatives include, but are not limited to, filling the instructional shortfall with part time contractors, extending the program of instruction time period and creating a student throughput delay/backlog, and/or keeping the program of instruction time period as is and accepting risk in training standards.

Moreover, sequestration will be noted in the Army Reserve through degraded training support systems, range operations and airfield operations capabilities, again due to civilian furloughs, requiring the Army to borrow qualified military manpower to

replace DA Civilian shortfalls. Some of these training support capabilities include the expanded use and increased maintenance of simulators (flight and ground vehicle, weapon, tactical), distributed learning facilities, and training aids, devices and simulations. For the Army Reserve, lack of funding will make it difficult to maintain Depot Maintenance initiatives; more than 40% of ARFORGEN-critical equipment, and disaster relief and Homeland Defense missions will be negatively impacted as equipment may not be repaired. Reductions in the Army Reserve Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) resources may lead to subsystem failures, further impacting Army Reserve facility readiness in support of Soldier training.

Another negative effect will be degraded administrative support in the areas of resource management, quality assurance and course program management, potentially causing a disruption to student services. Incremental funding of Mission Command Training contracts will reduce workforce available to support units' preparations for future training exercises with furloughs further limiting civilian availability to offset reductions.

### **Sustaining Readiness.**

**Ready and Resilient.** The Ready and Resilient Campaign is designed to guide the Army's efforts in building and maintaining resilience across the Total Army- Soldiers, Family Members and Army Civilians, improving unit readiness and further reinforcing the Army Profession. Commanders are ultimately responsible for Soldier resilience and unit readiness. Leaders at all levels must understand that high standards of professionalism and discipline represent readiness within their formations. The campaign reinforces leadership at the first line supervisor-level. Leaders are empowered and enabled to enforce standards of professionalism and discipline, and they are held accountable for maintaining and improving resilience and readiness within their formations. Incorporating resilience as a critical component in determining Soldier and unit readiness, emphasizing the importance of physical, psychological, and emotional factors in determining comprehensive fitness, and promoting a deliberate approach to building and sustaining resilience.



**Retrograde.** We have the policies, authorities, and processes in place to support the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan and maintain operational flexibility. The operational campaign plan drives the pace of retrograde operations. Up to this point, the Army is successfully retrograding equipment from Afghanistan while concurrently conducting combat operations. Our goal remains to have all non-enduring equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Supporting CENTCOM retrograde goals will cause us to take risks in other Army accounts. One cost driver is that multi-modal (air lift out of Afghanistan) is currently the primary means to retrograde equipment from Afghanistan because the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) modes continue to progressing slowly. Surface lines of communication (NDN/PAKGLOC) are critical to achieving the retrograde volume necessary to meet timelines and decrease costs. The Army plans to retrograde approximately \$20 billion worth of Army equipment to meet future requirements and improve Equipment on Hand Readiness across the Total Army.

**Reset.** Reset funding must continue as long as we have forces deployed and for three years after the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan to ensure readiness for future missions. A fully-funded Reset program ensures that battle damaged equipment is replaced and equipment worn-out by prolonged use in harsh environments is returned to a fully ready state commensurate with a unit's future mission. In the forecast for FY13, the Army expects to Reset (repair) approximately 100,000 items at its industrial facilities, and more than 600,000 pieces of equipment on site where units are stationed (including more than 400 aircraft). However, sequestration will cause us to defer some of these requirements to future fiscal years, immediately impacting equipment readiness. Equipment Reset is a vital means for maintaining Army equipment readiness in order to sustain a force that can meet our National Military Strategy. Since its inception, the Reset Program has improved the condition and readiness levels of Army ground and air systems. A consistently, fully-funded Reset program enabled the Army to maintain operational readiness of equipment at more than 90% and 75% for ground and aviation, respectively, in theater.

**Modernization.** As the Army prepares for another drawdown after more than 12 years of war, budget impacts and reduction in forces will negatively impact continued modernization of combat systems. The majority of our combat systems are legacy platforms tied to the fundamental design and technical constraints from the 1980s. While modernization actions have lengthened service life and added capabilities, the operational utilization rates, such as miles driven and hours flown, have continued to soar due to combat operations, well beyond the anticipated service life of the system. The length of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly degraded equipment and the Army must continue to Reset and modernize vehicles, weapons systems and aircraft for future contingencies. For example, the Army Reserve has 86% of its needed equipment but only 65% has been modernized. The equipment readiness lessons learned from the Vietnam War, a time when the Army's vehicles, weapons systems and aircraft readiness levels were unsatisfactorily low, are informative to our current situation.

**Army Organic Industrial Base.** The current fiscal uncertainty could drastically impact our strategy and threaten our requirement for an Army Organic Industrial Base that is a modern, reliable, cost effective, and highly responsive to meet both wartime and peacetime requirements, while maintaining the ability to surge during rapidly developing contingency operations. During times of war, the Army requires the Organic Industrial Base to repair and manufacture equipment as quickly and efficiently as possible to ensure it is available to train and support next deployers, as well as those deployed over the past decade. The Army's Organic Industrial Base Depots and Arsenals surged to double capacity, and in some cases, tripled their pre-war output. As the Army's Organic Industrial Base transitions from wartime production to peacetime requirements, we must ensure it remains effective, efficient, and capable of meeting current and future Army contingency requirements. A reasonable predictable funding program is critical to the health and readiness of our Organic Industrial Base

## **Closing.**

The Total Army must always be capable of providing strategic landpower that can prevent conflict, shape the environment and win the Nation's wars. The security of our nation is the result of the committed, experienced, well-led professional force of men and women who come from every corner of the United States to serve and protect this great country. In their service to the nation, our Soldiers have never failed to meet any demand that the nation has asked and expected. Therefore, the nation and our Army must never accept the risk of unprepared, untrained leaders and Soldiers because that risk will be paid for in the lives of our men and women. Now more than ever, Soldiers who willingly sacrifice for this great Nation, tour after tour, need the steadfast and loyal support of the American people and Congress to sustain our readiness, prepare our force for current and future contingencies, Reset the force and ensure we continue to modernize and transform equipment, and most importantly, fulfill our commitment to Army Families. The Army understands the Nation's fiscal constraints and we assure you that we will be good stewards of the resources given to us to prepare trained and ready forces for the future. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today. It is an honor to serve our great nation.