

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
3779	2	Gimenez, Carlos A.	ISO	Briefing Requirement on Selective Shielding for Gamma Radiation Exposure	EB 1
3916	1	Wittman, Robert	ISO	Requires a briefing Global Basemaps Requirement.	EB 1
3955	3	Kelly, Trent	ISO	Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing on the capabilities of electronic device detection systems safeguarding Controlled Classified National Security Information (CNSI) in SCIFs and SAPFs	EB 1
3989	2	Panetta, Jimmy	ISO	Directs a briefing on digital currencies for military operations, including that of special forces, in Africa.	EB 1
4021	3	Scott, Austin	ISO	DRL: Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a brief on the adequacy of Institutional Capacity Building of Countries within United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility.	EB 1
4041	3	Scott, Austin	ISO	Directs a briefing from AFSOC on battlefield digital interoperability.	EB 1
4076	1	Bergman, Jack	ISO	Quadrennial Biodefense Posture Review	EB 1
4080	0	Gallego, Ruben	ISO	DRL describing efforts to deepen and expand security cooperation with the Baltic states through the Baltic Security Initiative, and progress toward achieving capabilities outlined in individual Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives.	EB 1
4112	0	Turner, Michael	ISO	Bill language assigning responsibility to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency for the accreditation of sensitive compartment information facilities.	EB 1
4172	1	Jackson (TX), Ronny	ISO	Directs a briefing on how the reduction of resources and personnel in CENTCOM and AFRICOM has impacted SOCOM's mission.	EB 1
4196	1	Bacon, Don	ISO	Directs a briefing from USSOCOM on Pre-Motor Reaction Time Biosensors and Testing	EB 1
4353	1	Jackson (TX), Ronny	ISO	Directs a briefing on crisis response funding and its implications on SOCOMs budget.	EB 1
4418	2	Jacobs, Sara	ISO	Requires a plan from DOD to increase AM&E funding.	EB 1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
4421	1	Jacobs, Sara	ISO	Requires report on implementation of the US Strategy to Counter Corruption Objective 5.5, Improving security assistance and integrating corruption considerations into military planning, analysis, and operations	EB 1

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Gimenez of Florida**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Selective Shielding for Gamma Radiation Exposure**

The committee notes the 2023 Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Strategy recognized that the risks to the Department and the nation are “real and urgent,” and “addressing them requires the Department to account for WMD across the spectrum of conflict.” It also concluded that “commercial capabilities may help protect military and civilian personnel.” The committee is aware of new, innovative commercially available selective shielding technology that may safeguard individuals in gamma radiation-contaminated environments, on the battlefield and in recovery efforts. This equipment could enable warfighters or first responders to operate in a gamma radiation-contaminated environment for an extended period, protecting personnel and enhancing resilience and deterrence.

The committee understands that certain domestic emergency response units in the National Guard, and the active-duty Chemical Biological Incidence Response Force (CBIRF) have been equipped with or are in the process of integrating such selective shielding technology into their operational doctrine, but other units that might operate in a contaminated environment are currently not being equipped with protection from gamma radiation. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Service Secretaries, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2024, on the Department’s plans and requirements for wider acquisition and distribution of selective shielding technology for Department’s CBRN-response units and warfighters who

may have to operate in a radiation contaminated environment during a conflict. The briefing should include, but not be limited to:

- (1) The requirements responsive to the 2023 Counter-WMD Strategy to enhance resilience and enable the Joint Force to prevail in a CBRN environment;
- (2) The Department's near- and long-term strategy to procure equipment for service members who may be required to operate in a gamma radiation- contaminated environment;
- (3) The overall acquisition strategy for technologies that may protect against gamma radiation, including timelines, milestones, and estimated costs.
- (4) A description of how the Department is using commercial capabilities to increase the readiness of military personnel and response units to operate in a radiation-contaminated area.

**Amendment to H.R. 8070**  
**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025**

**Offered by: Mr. Wittman**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Global Basemaps Requirement

The committee acknowledges the critical importance of the Controlled Image Base (CIB) for diverse operational and intelligence applications within the Department of Defense and across federal agencies. These applications include cockpit displays, battle management systems, mission planning, and terrain analysis.

The committee recognizes the significant advancements in commercial remote sensing and data processing technologies, and believes the Department must explore more frequently updated geospatial intelligence products. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Director of the National Reconnaissance Officer, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than December 15, 2024, on requirements for global, monthly, quarterly, and/or annual basemaps at multiple image resolutions. The briefing shall include an assessment of commercially available sources and products that satisfy existing and emerging Controlled-Image Base requirements for the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and Federal Civilian agencies.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

**Offered by: Mr. Kelly**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### *Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems*

The committee recognizes the directives set forth in the Secretary of Defense's Security Review Follow-on Actions Memorandum, dated June 30, 2023. These directives require the programming for appropriate electronic device detection systems and mitigation measures in all Department of Defense (DoD) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and Special Access Program Facilities (SAPFs) by September 30, 2024. The Committee commends the Department for recognizing the urgency of these requirements.

However, the committee notes concerns regarding the oversight of electronic device detection and mitigation, which spans multiple offices within the Department, including Physical & Operations Security within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (OUSD (I&S)), Counterintelligence within the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), and Information Technology within the Deputy Chief Information Officer (DCIO) for the Information Enterprise (IE). The committee is concerned that a lack of clear guidance on who is primarily responsible may lead to confusion and lack of coordinated oversight.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than September 1, 2024. This briefing shall include the following:

- (1) how Department of Defense components will ensure that the electronic device detection systems safeguarding Controlled Classified National Security Information (CNSI) in SCIFs and SAPFs will be comprehensive solutions capable of detecting and accurately locating radio frequency transmitters, including but not limited to: Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth connected devices, Bluetooth low energy, and devices emitting only cellular signals;
- (2) the steps the Department is taking to ensure that these comprehensive cell phone detection and location solutions can discover a cell phone even when Wi-Fi and Bluetooth on the device are not active;
- (3) clarification of responsibilities within the Department for meeting these requirements; and
- (4) how the Department will program to meet these needs.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Panetta**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Digital Currency for Special Operations in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility

The committee recognizes growing interest in the use of digital currency among African states and by United States partner forces operating in Africa. The committee further recognizes the potential benefit of digital currency, including cryptocurrency, for special operations in Africa. Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Commander of United States Special Operations Command, and the Commander of United States Africa Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than June 01, 2025, on the following:

- (1) the anticipated future use of digital currencies, including cryptocurrency, in the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR), including for usages relating to United States national defense;
- (2) the status of digital currency adoption rates among African countries, including the use of cryptocurrency; digital currencies owned or operated by People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, or the Islamic Republic of Iran; and for the purposes of addressing challenges arising from volatile financial infrastructures;
- (3) the use of digital currencies by the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and any affiliated groups, including proxy forces, operating within the African continent;
- (4) the strengths and weaknesses of blockchain technology as it relates to United States national defense interests across the African continent;
- (5) the tactical and strategic challenges and opportunities of cryptocurrencies for United States Special Operations Forces operating in the USAFRICOM AOR;
- (6) whether the use of digital currencies, including cryptocurrency, would impact speed and reliability to which funds can be made available to support U.S. operations in Africa, including for crisis operations;
- (7) whether the use of cryptocurrency by United States personnel stationed in Africa could increase operational efficiency with partner forces;
- (8) the ability and utility of cryptocurrency to expand information collection techniques;

- (9) whether the use of cryptocurrency decreases security concerns associated with United States personnel obtaining and transporting physical U.S. dollars across the African continent, including in austere environments; and
- (10) any other matters the Under Secretary determines to be relevant.



## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Institutional Capacity Building of Countries within United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility**

The committee recognizes that Africa is a theater of strategic competition where the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia continue to increase their presence through economic and military relations. Stability in the region has suffered resulting in eight military coups in the Sahel region of Africa in just the last four years. This region serves as an important training ground for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) whose attacks spread across the African continent and the globe.

The committee notes the challenges faced by United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in building strategic partnerships with African nations and bolstering stability on the continent.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2025, on the adequacy of institutional capacity building of countries within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility to strengthen governance in the defense sector. At a minimum, the briefing shall include Department programs and efforts focused on:

- (1) strategy and policy development;
- (2) budget development and execution;
- (3) human resource management systems;
- (4) logistics processes; and
- (5) recommendations to counter PRC, Russian, and VEO influence through institutional capacity building by the Department.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Battlefield Digital Interoperability**

The committee notes that system interoperability continues to affect the exchange of data and field operations. The committee understands that the Air Force Special Operations Command successfully tested and validated lean services architecture (open published standard protocol) software solutions that provide enhanced digital interoperability between legacy, current, and future systems. The committee believes this work may significantly enhance air to ground digital interoperability, improving situational awareness, and ground force lethality.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2025, on any potential fiscal year funding and fielding plans for lean services architecture software solutions.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 8070**  
**OFFERED BY MR. BERGMAN OF MICHIGAN**

At the appropriate place in title X, insert the following:

1 **SEC. 10 \_\_\_. QUADRENNIAL BIODEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW.**

2 Chapter 2 of title 10, United States Code, is amended  
3 by inserting after section 118c the following new section:

4 **“§ 118d. Quadrennial biodefense posture review**

5 “(a) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN RE-  
6 QUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall every four years  
7 conduct a comprehensive examination of the biodefense  
8 policies, practices, programs and initiatives of the Depart-  
9 ment of Defense.

10 “(b) ELEMENTS.—Each review conducted under sub-  
11 section (a) shall include each of the following:

12 “(1) An inventory and assessment of all exist-  
13 ing strategies, plans, policies, laws, and interagency  
14 agreements related to biodefense, including preven-  
15 tion, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response,  
16 attribution, recovery, and mitigation.

17 “(2) An identification of the biological threats,  
18 including biological warfare, bioterrorism, naturally

1 occurring infectious diseases, and accidental expo-  
2 sures.

3 “(3) An identification of the current programs,  
4 efforts, or activities of the Department of Defense  
5 with respect to preventing the acquisition, prolifera-  
6 tion, and use of a biological weapon, preventing an  
7 accidental or naturally occurring biological outbreak,  
8 and mitigating the effects of a biological epidemic.

9 “(4) An identification of the roles and respon-  
10 sibilities of the elements of the Department of De-  
11 fense, including internal and external coordination  
12 procedures, in identifying and sharing information  
13 related to, warning of, and protection against, acts  
14 of terrorism using biological agents and weapons  
15 and accidental or naturally occurring biological out-  
16 breaks.

17 “(5) An identification of methods in use to ad-  
18 dress biological attacks with emerging artificial intel-  
19 ligence and cyber capabilities.

20 “(6) An identification of related or required ca-  
21 pabilities and activities required to support the na-  
22 tional biodefense strategy.

23 “(7) Recommendations for strengthening and  
24 improving the current biodefense capabilities, au-

1       thorities, and command structures of the Depart-  
2       ment

3               “(8) Recommendations for improving and for-  
4       malizing interagency coordination and support mech-  
5       anisms with respect to providing a robust national  
6       biodefense.

7               “(9) Any other matters the Secretary of De-  
8       fense determines necessary.

9               “(c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30  
10      days after the completion of a review under subsection (a),  
11      the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense  
12      committees a copy of the review. Each such review shall  
13      be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a clas-  
14      sified annex.”.



## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Gallego**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Baltic Security Initiative**

The Committee commends the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as model NATO allies in terms of burden sharing, investing over 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense expenditure, allocating over 20 percent of their defense budgets on capital modernization, and matching security assistance from the United States. The Committee also recognizes that supporting and strengthening the security of the Baltic states is in the national security interest of the United States.

The Committee therefore directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing not later than January 15, 2025 to the House Committee on Armed Services describing efforts to deepen and expand security cooperation with the Baltic states through the Baltic Security Initiative, and progress toward achieving capabilities outlined in individual Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 8070**  
**OFFERED BY MR. TURNER OF OHIO**

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

1 **SEC. 16 \_\_\_\_ . SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION**  
2 **FACILITY ACCREDITATION.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary of Defense  
4 for Intelligence and Security shall, not later than Decem-  
5 ber 31, 2029—

6 (1) assign responsibility to the Defense Coun-  
7 terintelligence and Security Agency for the accredi-  
8 tation of sensitive compartmented information facili-  
9 ties for all components of the Department of De-  
10 fense, including the military departments, except  
11 with respect to the National Security Agency, the  
12 National Reconnaissance Office, and the National  
13 Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

14 (2) ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence  
15 and Security Agency has the appropriate staff to  
16 successfully carry out such responsibility.

17 (b) NOTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO RESOURCE  
18 REQUIREMENTS.—The Under Secretary of Defense for  
19 Intelligence and Security shall notify the congressional in-

1 telligence committees and the congressional defense com-  
2 mittees with respect to the resource requirements for the  
3 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to carry  
4 out the accreditation responsibility under subsection (a).

5 (c) SUBMISSION OF REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The  
6 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security  
7 shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Se-  
8 curity Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaiss-  
9 sance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-  
10 Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intel-  
11 ligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services  
12 of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report  
13 not later than December 31, 2027, on the feasibility of  
14 the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency as-  
15 suming accreditation responsibility with respect to sen-  
16 sitive compartmented information facilities for the Na-  
17 tional Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Of-  
18 fice, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency by  
19 December 31, 2029.

20 (d) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES  
21 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “congressional intel-  
22 ligence committees” has the meaning given such term in  
23 section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.  
24 3003).





## **Amendment to H.R. 8070 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025**

### **Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Impact of Reduction of Forces on U.S. Special Operations Command

The committee is aware that over the past few years there has been a shift in resources and personnel to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, creating a resource constrained environment for special operations forces to operate in. The committee understands that there is now a greater burden placed upon U.S. Special Operations Command to provide resources and support in other geographic commands for execution of its missions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 31, 2025, on the any potential impact this shift may have on operations in the Middle East and Africa. The briefing shall include:

- (1) any potential impact that the reduction of personnel and resources within U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command has had on special operations forces operating in those areas of responsibility;
- (2) a review of the potential challenges faced by special operations forces as they plan and execute their missions in the resource constrained environment;
- (3) identification of additional resources required to support logistics when operating throughout the Middle East and Africa that have emerged over the last three years; and
- (4) an analysis of manpower that supports special operations forces in the region.

**Amendment to H.R. 8070**  
**Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National**  
**Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025**

**Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

**Pre-Motor Reaction Time Biosensors and Testing**

The committee remains concerned about the long-term impact of brain injury and encourages the Department of Defense to improve its capability to collect real-time neurophysiological data to establish an objective baseline of service member cognitive health and enable monitoring throughout their military service. The committee is encouraged by United States Special Operations Command's efforts to operationalize wearable neural biosensors for wrist-based Pre-Motor Reaction Time (PMT) neurophysiologic assessments to support early detection of neurotrauma, advise mental health interventions, and mitigate human risks from fatigue and other lapses in psychomotor vigilance. The committee is aware of the potential readiness benefit to the special operations community and recognizes the potential for these efforts to inform possible deployment of wrist based PMT biosensors and testing across the armed services. Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of United States Special Operations Command to provide to the House Committee on Armed Services a briefing no later than December 31, 2024, on:

- (1) the command's views of the added value of wrist-based PMT biosensors and testing for the monitoring of brain health, blast overpressure, physical neurotrauma, and psychomotor vigilance from initial combat-related training to retirement;
- (2) the command's views on best practices for wrist-based PMT biosensor usage models, frequency of use, data collection and handling, decision-making, operational requirements, and potential acquisition pathways for this technology; and
- (3) the command's views on potential transition of wrist-based PMT biosensors to a program of record for all USSOCOM personnel.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

### **Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **U.S. Special Operation Command Crisis Response Funding and Budget Constraints**

The committee understands that crisis response funding is utilized by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to respond swiftly to critical missions worldwide. The committee notes that special operations forces are executing crisis response operations in the areas of responsibility of various geographic combatant commands, however USSOCOM is responsible for budgeting these crisis response missions. The committee is concerned that the USSOCOM crisis response budget is consistently underfunded by the Department of Defense and therefore exhausted on an annual basis with time consuming reprogramming requests continuously required in order to backfill funds expended for these critical missions. Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 15, 2025, on crisis response funding for special operations forces. The briefing shall include:

- (1) an assessment of the feasibility of creating a cost-sharing structure between USSOCOM and the relevant geographic combatant command for execution of crisis response;
- (2) a description of the logistics, planning process, and funds that are required for the execution of crisis response missions;
- (3) a review of how determinations are made for resources utilized when conducting crisis response; and
- (4) an analysis of any instances in which USSOCOM's resources are utilized by a geographic combatant command for non-special operations missions and the use of such resources by the geographic combatant command creates a hinderance to operations for special operations forces mission requirements.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

**Offered by: Ms. Jacobs**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Resources for Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

The budget request for fiscal year 2025 requests funding for Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) and Strategic Evaluations that equals roughly 0.7 per cent of the total Department of Defense security cooperation budget. International standards note the importance of at least 3 percent of program funding going toward monitoring and evaluation. The committee notes the increase in funding for AM&E within the Department of Defense since fiscal year 2019 – when roughly 0.1 per cent of its budget went toward AM&E – and encourages the Department to continue to increase its funding.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2025, on the Department's plans for funding of AM&E for security cooperation through fiscal year 2030. This plan should include the authorities, resources, and staffing required.

## **Amendment to H.R. 8070**

**Offered by: Ms. Jacobs**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 8070, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Implementing Strategic Objective 5.5 of the 2021 United States Strategy on Countering Corruption**

Strategic Objective 5.5 of the 2021 United States Strategy on Countering Corruption directs the Department of Defense to take certain actions to integrate corruption considerations into military planning, analysis, and operations related to security cooperation. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with Secretary of State, to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 15, 2025, on progress implementing the Department's responsibilities related to Strategic Objective 5.5.