### SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES EN BLOC #1

				TILL ON STRATEGICT OROLS LIVELOC#1	
LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
2655	0	Jackson (TX), Ronny	STR	Eliminate the sunset for NNSA's authority to adjust minor construction threshold for inflation.	EB 1
2658	2	Wittman, Robert	STR	Requires a briefing updating Congress on domestic mobile launches and possible DOD acceleration of development and deployment of mobile, dual-use, sea-based orbital launch platforms.	EB 1
2715	2	Bergman, Jack	STR	PLAN FOR AN INTEGRATED AND RESILIENT SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE FOR THE SPACE FORCE	EB 1
2730	0	Strong, Dale W.	STR	Directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing on the Agency's plan to develop realistic threat targets for intercept testing.	EB 1
2734	0	Strong, Dale W.	STR	Directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a report on the anticipated munitions requirements for the Guam Defense System.	EB 1
2753	0	Bacon, Don	STR	Airborne Nuclear Command and Control Alert Posture	EB 1
2754	1	Bacon, Don	STR	Nuclear Command and Control Enterprise Modernization	EB 1
2835	2	Stefanik, Elise	STR	Requires a brief on technology transfers between the People's Republic of China and Iran that are furthering Iranian ICBM and SLV capabilities.	EB 1
2908	0	Mace, Nancy	STR	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Economic Indicator Monitoring and LUNO Programs	EB 1
2910	0	Mace, Nancy	STR	Commercial Satellite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Procurement	EB 1
2918	1	Kiggans, Jennifer A.	STR	Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committee on the progress of the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed program.	EB 1
2980	0	Carbajal, Salud O.	STR	This allows the Space Force to charge commercial space companies for indirect costs associated with launch activities.	EB 1
3001	0	Carbajal, Salud O.	STR	Establishes a working group to address the cybersecurity risks of the National Nuclear Security Administration nuclear weapon systems as identified in the Sep 2022 GAO report.	EB 1

Cover Page: 1 of 4 Created 6/20/23, 7:36 PM

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
3136	1	Turner, Michael	STR	Policy and report on North Atlantic Treaty Organization integrated air and missile defense capabilities.	EB 1
3143	1	Garamendi, John	STR	Independent Assessment of Plutonium Pit Aging Milestones and Progress	EB 1
3194	1	DesJarlais, Scott	STR	Requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to issue a report on additional authorities that may accelerate nuclear modernization timeline	EB 1
3206	0	Carbajal, Salud O.	STR	This amends DRL titled Commercial Satellite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Procurement to require the report highlight build vs buy in satellite imagery architecture.	EB 1
3214	1	Mills, Cory	STR	Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2024, on Iran's progress with respect to its nuclear program.	EB 1
3225	1	Turner, Michael	STR	Report language directing the Secretary of Defense to report on potential enhancements to U.S. and Allied air and missile defense capabilities that could contribute to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD).	EB 1
3243	1	Bacon, Don	STR	Report on defense of US bases in Europe and Pacific Region from missile and air attack	EB 1
3246	1	Wittman, Robert	STR	Space Constellation Security Program. Requires the Chief of Space Operations to deliver a report on the future strategy and milestones expected to stand up a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), to include the funding required to implement it.	EB 1
3283	1	Garamendi, John	STR	Develop an integrated master schedule for nuclear warhead development and production activities.	EB 1
3316	0	Strong, Dale W.	STR	Directs the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering to provide a briefing on the current inventory of retired military motors suitable for unguided, fin-stabilized rocketry.	EB 1
3374	2	Strong, Dale W.	STR	Briefing on the Development of AFRL Modular Aerospike Rocket Engine	EB 1
3382	0	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Requires a briefing from NNSA related to x-ray effects testing and certification	EB 1
3384	1	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Requires DoD to provide a plan for expeditious fielding of the HBTSS constellation as the program transitions from MDA to SDA.	EB 1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
3388	1	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Requiring a report on development of a hypersonics CONOPS strategy.	EB 1
3389	1	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Asks the Space Force for analysis of the resiliency of the entire missile warning constellation.	EB 1
3392	1	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Requests a report on space launch protection and consider new technologies for national security launch protection that involve counter UAS	EB 1
3404	0	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Allows NNSA to accept contributions to accelerate or removal or security of fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at vulnerable sites worldwide.	EB 1
3430	2	Mace, Nancy	STR	Tracking of High Altitude Surveillance Objects Report	EB 1
3433	0	Bacon, Don	STR	Commercial Weather Forecasting Capabilities	EB 1
3434	0	Lamborn, Doug	STR	Requires a report relating to the partnership between the United States and Australia on hypersonic capability development and testing.	EB 1
3449	0	Moulton, Seth	STR	To require competitive procedures for procurement for Homeland Defense Over The Horizon Radars	EB 1
3483	4	Davis, Donald G.	STR	To require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services studying the Aleutian Test Range as a site for a hypersonic test range and corridor for testing long-distance hypersonic weapons systems.	EB 1
3489	0	Garamendi, John	STR	DRL Report on the status of the advanced recovery and integrated extraction system	EB 1
3492	1	Garamendi, John	STR	DRL Plutonium Pit reuse for W-93	EB 1
3511	2	Wilson, Joe	STR	Directs the Chief Space Force Technology and Innovation Officer to provide a report describing the technical maturity, cost, benefits, and risks associated with fielding a high-power megawatt (above two megawatts) nuclear-electric power and propulsion asset in space.	EB 1
3537	1	DesJarlais, Scott	STR	Requires an updated independent analysis examining the feasibility and advisability of developing a space-based missile defense capability.	EB 1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
3629	1	Moylan, Jim	STR	Guam Defense System Study	EB 1
3632	0	Rogers, Mike	STR	Directs the Secretary of Energy to provide a report to the committee on an analysis of possible alternatives to replace the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.	EB 1
3640	0	Jackson (TX), Ronny	STR	Require a briefing on security enhancements at NNSA sites.	EB 1
3641	1	Jackson (NC), Jeff	STR	Would require a report on Artificial Intelligence in U.S. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications	EB 1

## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. JACKSON OF TEXAS

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following:

1	SEC. 31 MODIFICATION OF MINOR CONSTRUCTION
2	THRESHOLD FOR PLANT PROJECTS.
3	Section 4701(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act
4	(Public Law 107–314; 50 U.S.C. 2741(2)) is amended—
5	(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking "During
5	the period beginning on December 23, 2022, and
7	ending on November 30, 2025, the" and inserting
8	"The"; and
9	(2) by striking subparagraph (C).
	$\boxtimes$

## Offered by: Mr. Wittman

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Activities to Accelerate the Development and Deployment of Sea-Based Orbital Launch
Platforms

The committee recognizes the importance of resilient launch infrastructure capacity for the future of security of space assets and capabilities. The committee is encouraged by efforts for the Department of Defense to secure access to space to date. However, the committee also encourages the Department to continue exploring the types of opportunities that might be presented by new and innovative launch platforms. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit and the Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee not later than December 1, 2023, that includes the following:

- (1) A review of opportunities to accelerate the development and deployment of mobile, dual-use, sea-based orbital launch platforms;
- (2) a summary of the Department's efforts to advance its technical understanding of the maturity and operational utility of new and emerging mobile offshore launch platform technology;
- (3) a summary of any actions taken to date or potentially required in the future for the Department of Defense to coordinate with other agencies to allow a domestic mobile, dual-use, sea-based capability for use in U.S. territorial waters; and,
- (4) an estimate of the potential cost and timeline that would be required to allow for the Department to support at least one launch from a domestic mobile, dual-use, sea-based orbital launch platform.

## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. BERGMAN OF MICHIGAN

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

1	SEC. 16 PLAN FOR AN INTEGRATED AND RESILIENT
2	SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITEC-
3	TURE FOR THE SPACE FORCE.
4	(a) In General.—The Secretary of the Air Force,
5	in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air
6	Force for Space Acquisition and Integration and the Chief
7	of Space Operations, shall—
8	(1) as part of the force design process for the
9	Space Force, consider options for the integration re-
10	silient military tactical satellite communications ca-
11	pabilities;
12	(2) develop a plan for the integration of such
13	capabilities into the Space Force, as required under
14	subsection (b); and
15	(3) ensure that a geostationary small satellite
16	communications constellation is evaluated for inclu-
17	sion as a component of the space data transport
18	force design of the Space Force through, at min-
19	imum, the end of fiscal year 2027.

1	(b) Plan for Integration.—
2	(1) In General.—The Secretary of the Air
3	Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary
4	of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integra-
5	tion and the Chief of Space Operations, shall develop
6	a plan for an integrated and resilient satellite com-
7	munications architecture for the Space Force.
8	(2) Elements.—The plan under paragraph (1)
9	shall include, at a minimum, options for—
10	(A) leveraging commercially available geo-
11	stationary small satellite communications tech-
12	nology developed and produced in the United
13	States;
14	(B) ensuring sufficient funding for such an
15	integration;
16	(C) including the unique requirements for
17	small satellite communications constellation
18	throughout the acquisition and deployment pe-
19	riod, including support for global X-band cov-
20	erage and support for secure communications
21	waveforms using on-board digital processing;
22	and
23	(D) potential integration of such geo-
24	stationary small satellite communications capa-
25	bility into the enterprise satellite communica-

1	tions management and control (commonly
2	known as "ESC-MC") implementation plan of
3	the Department of Defense.
4	(3) Briefing.—Not later than the date speci-
5	fied in paragraph (4), than the Secretary of the Air
6	Force shall provide to the congressional defense
7	committees a briefing on the plan developed under
8	paragraph (1).
9	(4) Date specified.—The date specified in
10	this subsection is the earlier of—
11	(A) July 1, 2024; or
12	(B) the date on which the Secretary of the
13	Air Force completes the space data transport
14	force design for the Space Force.

## Offered by: Mr. Strong

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Next Generation Interceptor Testing**

The committee notes the Next Generation Interceptor program is intended to address increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the homeland. As threats continue to develop and utilize sophisticated countermeasures, the suite of missile defense targets must likewise evolve.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 1, 2023, on the Agency's plan to develop threat-representative targets to ensure realistic intercept testing. The briefing shall include a description of activities within the planned future years defense program, as well as long-term plans.

## Offered by: Mr. Strong

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Guam Defense Munitions Requirements

The committee continues to support efforts to improve the defense of Guam against the full spectrum of advanced missile threats. The committee also wishes to gain a greater understanding of future procurement needs for the defense of Guam.

The committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in consultation with the commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than March 1, 2024, on the anticipated munitions requirements for the Guam Defense System and an associated fielding schedule.

## Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Airborne Nuclear Command and Control Modernization and Posture

The committee understands that the Department of Defense is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to consider follow-on platforms to provide Emergency Action Message origination and secondary intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch capabilities currently performed by the E-6B Mercury as part of the Looking Glass mission. The committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than September 1, 2023, on the results of the evaluation and its recommendations. The briefing shall also include an assessment of the feasibility, advisability, and estimated costs of resuming continuous airborne operations for the Looking Glass mission.

## Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Enterprise Modernization

The committee is aware of the critical importance of the complex technical architecture that supports the command, control, and communications of the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent. For this reason, the committee supports the Department of Defense's 2018 policy decision to clarify the roles and responsibilities for the Department's nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) enterprise. However, the committee remains concerned about the limited progress made in transitioning NC3 enterprise modernization requirements to new programs of record since the 2018 decision. The committee therefore directs the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2024 on the Department's strategy, schedule, and estimated resource requirements needed to modernize the nation's NC3 enterprise. This briefing shall also include:

- (1) A description of the current and proposed NC3 architecture linking combatant commanders to the President and other senior national defense leaders through secure conferencing and decision data visualization;
- (2) A description of planned upgrades to emergency action message dissemination systems to improve reliability and transmission of planning data updates to each leg of the triad and critical NC3 centers including the National Military Command Center and the combatant commanders;
- (3) An assessment of gaps in the nation's strategic warning sensors and associated processing networks capable of detecting adversary targeting of national strategic warning and decision systems;
- (4) An assessment of gaps in current NC3 physical survivability, our resilience to the threat of peer adversaries acting simultaneously, and how increased mobility may improve this survivability; and
- (5) A description by service and joint program offices of all NC3 modernization programs currently funded in the future years defense plan.

## Offered by: Ms. Stefanik

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Brief on Technology Transfers and Technical Assistance from the People's Republic of China to Iran.

The committee is concerned with Iran's deepening partnership with the People's Republic of China (PRC), characterized by recent illicit technology transfers between the authoritarian regimes. According to the U.S. State Department, entities within the PRC have directly contributed to Iran's ballistic missile development, resulting in sanctions being imposed in June 2023. The committee notes that with this assistance, Iran maintains the largest missile force in the Middle East, while advancing its dual-use space launch and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities.

To better understand PRC assistance to Iranian weapons development and procurement and the growing threat from Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to brief to the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives no later than March 1, 2024, on how the CCP and PRC entities have aided in the development of Iranian missile programs. The brief shall include:

- (1) A synopsis of all known or assessed technology transfers and technical assistance from the PRC, or PRC entities, to Iran, actively concluded or planned, that further Iran's nuclear weapons program, ICBM capabilities, space launch, and offensive missile programs;
- (2) The Department's assessment of the impact of these technology transfers on the ability of the Iranian regime to accelerate the pursuit of ICBM, SLV, and intermediate-range capabilities;
- (3) An order of battle of Iranian ballistic missiles with ranges over 500 km over the next five years;
- (4) An overview of Iranian SLV programs.

Offered by: Ms. Mace

In the portion of the report to accompany H.R. 2670 titled "National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Economic Indicator Monitoring and LUNO Programs" insert after the first sentence of the second paragraph, the following new text: "The NGA should leverage the LUNO program to both bring forward new commercially derived analytic capabilities and further build that part of the industrial base, supporting new and medium size entrants into the market, as the NRO has done with their Strategic Capabilities Enhancement program."

Offered by: Ms. Mace

In the portion of the report to accompany H.R. 2670 titled "Commercial Satellite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Procurement," insert at the end of the second sentence, the following new text: "and encourages the NRO to expand its current use of Electro-Optical data".

#### Amendment to H.R. 2670

#### National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024

## Offered by: Mrs. Kiggans

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB)

The Committee is encouraged by the Department of Defense's efforts to test our nation's hypersonics capabilities in innovative, faster, and more affordable ways. This includes leveraging commercial products and services, such as launch services, through the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB) program. To meet the pacing threat, the committee believes the Department must continue to maximize commercially-available launch vehicles and services for hypersonic components and payloads to increase the rate of flight opportunities. Further, the committee encourages the Department to fully fund the MACH-TB program in future year's budget requests to achieve full-scale flight test objectives and expansion of critical test infrastructure. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the House Armed Services Committee by January 31, 2024, on the progress of the MACH-TB program. The report shall address a schedule for procuring launch vehicles in blocks to achieve cost savings for the government and provide certainty and flexibility for the program.

## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

1	SEC. 16 ENHANCED AUTHORITY TO INCREASE SPACE
2	LAUNCH CAPACITY THROUGH SPACE
3	LAUNCH SUPPORT SERVICES.
4	Chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, is
5	amended by inserting after section 2276 the following new
6	section:
7	"§ 2276b. Special authority for provision of space
8	launch support services to increase space
9	launch capacity
10	"(a) In General.—The Secretary of a military de-
11	partment, pursuant to the authorities in this section or
12	any other provision of law, may increase Federal and com-
13	mercial space launch capacity on any domestic real prop-
14	erty under the control of the Secretary through the provi-
15	sion of space launch support services.
16	"(b) Provision of Launch Equipment and Serv-
17	ICES TO COMMERCIAL ENTITIES.—
18	"(1) AGREEMENT AUTHORITY.—The Secretary
19	concerned may enter into contracts or other trans-

	<del>-</del>
1	actions with commercial entities that intend to con-
2	duct space launch activities on a military installation
3	under the jurisdiction of the Secretary. Any such
4	agreement may include the provision of supplies,
5	services, equipment, and construction needed for
6	commercial space launch.
7	"(2) AGREEMENT COSTS.—
8	"(A) DIRECT COSTS.—An agreement en-
9	tered into under paragraph (1) shall include a
10	provision that requires the commercial entity
11	entering into the agreement to reimburse the
12	Department of Defense for all direct costs to
13	the United States that are associated with the
14	goods, services, and equipment provided to the
15	commercial entity under the agreement.
16	"(B) Indirect costs.—In addition, the
17	contract may include a provision that requires
18	the commercial entity to reimburse the Depart-
19	ment of Defense for such indirect costs as the
20	Secretary concerned considers to be appro-
21	priate. In such a case, the contract may provide
22	for the recovery of indirect costs through estab-
23	lishment of a rate, fixed price, or similar mech-

anism the Secretary concerned finds reasonable.

24

1	"(3) Retention of funds collected from
2	COMMERCIAL USERS.—Amounts collected from a
3	commercial entity pursuant to paragraph (2) shall
4	be credited to the appropriation accounts under
5	which the costs associated with the agreement (di-
6	rect and indirect) were incurred.
7	"(c) Definitions.—In this section:
8	"(1) SPACE LAUNCH.—The term 'space launch'
9	includes all activities, supplies, equipment, facilities,
10	or services supporting launch preparation, launch,
11	reentry, recovery, and other launch-related activities
12	for both the payload and the space transportation
13	vehicle.
14	"(2) Commercial entity.—The term 'com-
15	mercial entity' or 'commercial' means a non-Federal
16	entity organized under the laws of the United States
17	or of any jurisdiction within the United States.
18	"(d) Transition Limitations and Reporting Re-
19	QUIREMENTS.—For fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026,
20	the Secretary concerned shall—
21	"(1) limit indirect costs reimbursed pursuant to
22	subsection (b)(2)(B) to no more than 30 percent,
23	not to exceed \$5,000,000 annually, of total direct
24	cost reimbursements required under any agreement
25	authorized by subsection (b); and

1	(2) not later than 90 days after each such fis-
2	cal year, submit to each of the congressional defense
3	committees a briefing that—
4	"(A) identifies total direct and indirect
5	amount reimbursed to each spaceport for the
6	prior fiscal year;
7	"(B) describes support provided by reim-
8	bursed indirect costs for the prior fiscal year;
9	and
10	"(C) identifies indirect rate and analysis
11	used to determine the indirect rate for the next
12	fiscal year.".



## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following:

1	SEC. 31 CYBERSECURITY RISK INVENTORY, ASSESS-
2	MENT, AND MITIGATION WORKING GROUP.
3	Subtitle A of title XXXII of the National Defense Au-
4	thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–
5	65) is amended by adding at the end the following new
6	section:
7	"SEC. 3222. CYBERSECURITY RISK INVENTORY, ASSESS-
8	MENT, AND MITIGATION WORKING GROUP.
9	"(a) Establishment.—There is in the Administra-
10	tion a working group, to be known as the 'Cybersecurity
11	Risk Inventory, Assessment, and Mitigation Working
12	Group'.
13	"(b) Membership.—Members of the working group
14	shall include the Deputy Administrator for Defense Pro-
15	grams, the Associate Administrator for Information Man-
16	agement and Chief Information Officer, and staff from
17	other offices as determined appropriate by the Deputy Ad-
18	ministrator and Associate Administrator.

1	"(c) Comprehensive Strategy.—The working
2	group shall prepare a comprehensive strategy for
3	inventorying the range of National Nuclear Security Ad-
4	ministration systems that are potentially at risk in the
5	operational technology and nuclear weapons information
6	technology environments, assessing the systems at risk,
7	and implementing risk mitigation actions. Such strategy
8	shall incorporate key elements of effective cybersecurity
9	risk management strategies, as identified by the Govern-
10	ment Accountability Office, including the specification
11	of—
12	"(1) goals, objectives, activities, and perform-
13	ance measures;
14	"(2) organizational roles, responsibilities, and
15	coordination;
16	"(3) necessary resources needed to implement
17	the strategy over the next ten years; and
18	"(4) detailed milestones and schedules for com-
19	pletion of tasks.
20	"(d) Submission to Congress.—
21	"(1) Briefing.—Not later than 120 days after
22	the date of the enactment of this Act, the members
23	of the working group shall provide to the congres-
24	sional defense committees a briefing on the plan of

1	the working group plan to develop the strategy re-
2	quired under subsection (c).
3	"(2) Submission of Strategy.—Not later
4	than April 1, 2025, the working group shall submit
5	the congressional defense committees a copy of the
5	completed strategy.
7	"(e) Termination.—The working group shall termi-
8	nate on the date that is five years after the date of the
9	enactment of this section.".



## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. TURNER OF OHIO

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

1	SEC. 16 POLICY AND REPORT ON NORTH ATLANTIC
2	TREATY ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVE INTE-
3	GRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPA-
4	BILITIES IN EUROPE.
5	(a) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to
6	contribute integrated air and missile defense capabilities,
7	such as forward deployed AN/TPY-2 radars and Aegis
8	Ashore sites, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
9	to defeat increasingly complex threats to the United States
10	Armed Forces and the military forces of member countries
11	of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe.
12	(b) Report.—
13	(1) NATO REPORT.—Not later than 270 days
14	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15	retary of Defense shall provide to the North Atlantic
16	Treaty Organization Conference of National Arma-
17	ments Directors for Ballistic Missile Defense a re-
18	port containing options to improve the existing inte-
19	grated air and missile defense architecture to detect,

1	track, and defend against increasingly complex ad-
2	versarial missile threats to the territory of member
3	countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
4	and deployed members of the United States Armed
5	Forces.
6	(2) Congressional Briefing.—Not later than
7	14 days after the completion of the report required
8	under paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall
9	provide to the congressional defense committees a
10	briefing on the options contained in the report and
11	the steps necessary to implement any such option
12	that is agreed to by the member countries of the
13	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.



## AMENDMENT TO H.R.

#### OFFERED BY MR. GARAMENDI OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

1	SEC INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF PLUTONIUM PIT
2	AGING MILESTONES AND PROGRESS.
3	(a) In General.—The Administrator for Nuclear
4	Security shall seek to enter into an arrangement with the
5	scientific advisory group known as JASON to conduct an
6	assessment of the report entitled "Research Program Plan
7	for Plutonium and Pit Aging", published by the National
8	Nuclear Security Administration in September 2021, and
9	the work undertaken as a result of such report.
10	(b) Elements.—The assessment required under
11	subsection (a) shall contain the following:
12	(1) A determination regarding whether the re-
13	port referred to in such subsection meets the criteria
14	for appropriate pit aging research described by
15	JASON in its 2019 Pit Aging Letter Report (JSR-
16	19-2A).
17	(2) Information relating to any improvements
18	or additions to such report.

2

1 (3) A review of initial data collected by the Na-2 tional Laboratories included in such report to deter-3 mine the possibility of updating the expected life-4 times of plutonium pits, including, if such updates 5 are not possible, an estimate of when such a updates 6 would be possible.



## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. DESJARLAIS OF TENNESSEE

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

- 1 SEC. 16 . REPORT ON ACCELERATION OF NUCLEAR MOD-
- 2 ERNIZATION PRIORITIES.
- 3 The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
- 4 Sustainment shall submit to the congressional defense
- 5 committees a report that includes an identification of any
- 6 additional authorities and reforms necessary to allow the
- 7 Department of Defense to accelerate its current nuclear
- 8 modernization priorities.



Offered by: Mr. Carbajal

In the portion of the report to accompany H.R. 2670 titled "Commercial Satellite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Procurement" strike the period at the end of the paragraph following "proceeding" and insert the following new text ", including how buy versus build decisions will be balanced in future architectures."

## Offered by: Mr. Cory Mills

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Iranian Hardening of Nuclear Facilities

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2024, on Iran's progress with respect to its nuclear program. The brief should include the following information:

- (1) the status of Iranian efforts to harden their nuclear facilities, particularly the new facilities in Natanz;
- (2) the capabilities of the United States, and our allies and partners in the region to strike these sites if necessary; and (3) the status of nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia.

#### Amendment to H.R. 2670

# National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 Offered by: Mr. Turner

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

## Integrated Air and Missile Defense Architecture in NATO Area of Operations

The committee recognizes the willingness of Russia to employ varying types of air-breathing and ballistic missiles during conflict, including hypersonic weapons, in the illegal Russian aggression against Ukraine. Further, the committee recognizes Russia's bellicose language threatening strikes against NATO members. The committee also notes the threats posed by Iran's continued development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs.

The committee urges the United States to initiate discussions within the NATO Military Committee Working Group for Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) regarding the current NATO policy regarding IAMD, and options to improve the current NATO IAMD architecture to detect, track, and defend against adversarial missile threats.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and Commander of European Command, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than March 31, 2024, detailing potential enhancements to U.S. and Allied air and missile defense capabilities that could contribute to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) using a 360-degree approach, tailored to address threats emanating from all strategic directions. The report shall be in unclassified form but include a classified annex if necessary. The report should include:

- (1) a description of US efforts and challenges to increase the Alliance's IAMD capability, considering, as applicable, NATO's Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) Family of Plans, NATO's Defense Planning Process (NDPP), and other NATO IAMD related activities.
- (2) an assessment of the operational, political, and technical feasibility and advisability of developing, fielding, modifying, integrating, or otherwise employing current and future U.S. defensive resources to further improve NATO IAMD to protect against any air or missile

threat or attack (e.g., cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic), including but not limited to:

- (A) sensors to detect, track, discriminate, and support the engagement of multi-axial air and missile threats.
- (B) defensive interceptor systems; and
- (C) passive defense options.
- (3) a U.S funding profile, by year, detailing the complete costs associated with the options assessed under paragraph (2); and
- (4) such other information as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

# AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. BACON OF NEBRASKA

At the appropriate place in title X, insert the following:

1	SEC. 10 REPORT ON DEFENSE OF DEPARTMENT OF DE-
2	FENSE FACILITIES AND FORCES IN EURO-
3	PEAN AND INDO-PACIFIC REGIONS FROM
4	MISSILE AND AIR ATTACK.
5	(a) Study.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct
6	a study to determine whether the Department of Defense
7	has sufficient forces, systems, and capabilities to defend
8	Department of Defense military facilities and deployed
9	forces in the European and Indo-Pacific regions from
10	hypersonic-, ballistic-, cruise-missile and air attack, or to
11	otherwise defeat such attacks.
12	(b) Report.—
13	(1) In General.—Not later than June 30,
14	2024, the Secretary shall submit to the congres-
15	sional defense committees a report on the findings of
16	the study required by subsection (a). Such report
17	shall include a specific and detailed plan for ensur-
18	ing the ability of the Department of Defense to de-
19	fend Department of Defense military facilities and

1	deployed forces in the European and Indo-Pacific re-
2	gions from hypersonic-, ballistic-, cruise-missile and
3	air attack through 2030.
4	(2) Form of Report.—The report required by
5	this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified
6	form, but may include a classified annex.
7	(3) Public availability.—Not later than 14
8	days after the date of the submission of the report
9	required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall make
10	an unclassified summary of the report available to
11	the public on an appropriate internet website of the
12	Department of Defense.



### Offered by: Mr. Wittman

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Space Constellation Security Program

The committee continues to support the commercial space industry and recognizes the U.S. National Security Space Architecture is operationally enhanced by the robust U.S. commercial space market. The United States Space Force has had tremendous success in leveraging commercial space capabilities to provide effects to U.S. warfighters and our allies including in the Russian war in Ukraine.

The committee is pleased with the United States Space Force's effort to stand up a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), which will enable a partnership with industry in peacetime and times of conflict. The committee directs no later than February 1, 2024, the Chief of Space Operations shall submit to the House Armed Services Committee a report containing the following:

- (1) a future strategy and implementation milestones to stand up a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), including the estimated funding required to implement it;
- (2) identification of any specific authorities the Chief determines need to be modified by law to improve the ability of the Space Force to enable a partnership with industry in peacetime and times of conflict, and an explanation for why such modified authorities are needed; and,
  - (3) any other information the Chief thinks would be appropriate.

# AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. GARAMENDI OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following:

- TURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.

  (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 31, 2024, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop an integrated master schedule for the future-years nuclear security program that incorporates all programs of record for nuclear warhead development, including pit production activities, production, and sustainment at the National Nuclear Security Administration.
- Administrator for Nuclear Security shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the final integrated master schedule developed under subsection (a).

(b) Briefing.—Not later than May 15, 2024, the



10

#### Offered by: Mr. Strong

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Addressing Diminishing Inventory of Legacy Rocket Motors

The committee notes that unguided rocketry has a long history of advancing the technology readiness levels of developmental items, collecting flight data, and as serving as targets to test missile defense systems. Retired and decommissioned military rocket motors have played a key role in this effort and continue to support an array of users including the Space Force, Navy, Army, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). However, inventories of retired motors continue to diminish, and legacy motor designs may lack performance necessary to meet the Department's emerging needs, such as the development of hypersonic capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2024, on the current inventory of retired military motors suitable for unguided, fin-stabilized rocketry. The briefing shall include a discussion of options to address diminishing inventory of legacy rocket motors, including an assessment the feasibility and advisability of conducting a centralized acquisition of a low-cost unguided motor with sufficient thrust to achieve environments relevant to the development of hypersonic systems.

### Offered by: Mr. Strong

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Briefing on Aerospike Rocket Integration and Suborbital Experiment

The committee is aware of Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) progress in expanding rocket propulsion technology within its Affordable Responsive Modular Rocket (ARMR) portfolio through programs such as the Aerospike Rocket Integration and Suborbital Experiment (ARISE).

The committee is encouraged by steps taken towards testing of aerospikes, which show the potential to provide a significant increase in specific impulse, as well as the increased use of additive manufacturing in rocket design and manufacturing. The committee believes continued progress in these, and other areas of advanced rocket design are important to the Department of Defense's efforts to develop the rocket propulsion designs of the future.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with and the Commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 31, 2024, on the progress of ARISE. The briefing should include the following information: (2) an assessment of testing infrastructure required for development of aerospike propulsion technology, including any shortfalls; (3) projected funding requirements; and (4) the anticipated schedule for development and transition of technologies to production programs for ARISE, including needed testing of the system.

#### Offered by: Mr. Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Development of Expanded X-ray Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Using an Advanced KrF Laser

The Committee recognizes the important efforts that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are making to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear stockpile with science-based methods. The importance of X-ray nuclear weapons effects testing due to modernization programs for the nuclear stockpile, the increasing reliance on advanced sensors whose vulnerability to x-rays is a recognized concern, and the growing nuclear threats from China, Russia, and rogue nations. The Committee is concerned that shortfalls remain in x-ray testing and certification that even modern high-performance computing on three-dimensional modeling systems cannot close. To address this gap, and based on advances in low-cost, ultra-high-energy KrF laser technology, the Committee directs the Administrator of NNSA to provide a briefing no later than December 1, 2023 on plans to close this gap and how ultra-high-energy KrF laser technology could be used for modeling, mission, analysis and target design to support large scale x-ray effects testing.

## Offered by: Mr. Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Plan for the Development and Fielding of Fire Control Quality Missile Defense Data from Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

The Committee finds that the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, or HBTSS, is a critical capability that will enable the United States to detect, track, and engage missile threats with high-fidelity fire control. The Committee also notes that two HBTSS prototypes developed by the Missile Defense Agency are set to enter service later this calendar year. However, the committee is concerned that the transition of the program requirements to the Space Development Agency and resulting changes in the development and fielding plans could delay providing the global, persistent hypersonic missile defense fire control quality data that HBTSS was planned to provide to the warfighter. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee on the following information no later than December 1, 2023:

- (1) The continued involvement of the Missile Defense Agency in the development of the missile tracking and defense space architecture to ensure missile defense systems have the necessary fire control data and field of view coverage;
- (2) A plan over the future years defense program for procuring and fielding sensors that will meet missile defense requirements; and
- (3) Plans for continued collaboration between the Space Development Agency and the Missile Defense Agency on various elements of hypersonic and ballistic missile defense.

# AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. LAMBORN OF COLORADO

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

1	SEC. 16 REPORT ON CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR
2	OFFENSIVE HYPERSONIC SYSTEMS.
3	(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date
4	of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense,
5	in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
6	Staff, shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
7	tees a report on the status of the implementation of a con-
8	cept of operations and total munitions requirements for
9	offensive hypersonic systems.
10	(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection
11	(a) shall include the following:
12	(1) A description and assessment of efforts to
13	develop and implement concepts of operation with
14	regard to fielding, deploying, and using offensive
15	hypersonic systems currently in development and in-
16	cluded in future-years defense program submitted to
17	Congress under section 221 of title 10, United
18	States Code, for fiscal year 2024.

1	(2) An assessment of how the use of hypersonic
2	weapons will be considered with regard to strategic
3	deterrence and stability.
4	(3) A description of scenarios and simulations
5	modeling the use of offensive hypersonic systems in
6	defined environments.
7	(4) Criteria to be used for validation of the use
8	of offensive hypersonic systems.
9	(5) Identification of existing authorities gov-
10	erning the use of offensive hypersonic systems and
11	an explanation of any additional authorities that
12	may be required for the use of such systems.
13	(6) A description of how hypersonic capabilities
14	are incorporated into force development and design.
15	(7) A munitions requirement (applicable
16	through the period covered by the future-years de-
17	fense program submitted to Congress under section
18	221 of title 10, United States Code, for fiscal year
19	2024) for each offensive hypersonic weapons pro-
20	gram currently in development, including require-
21	ments provided by each military department and
22	combatant command.
23	(8) Identification of any operational gaps for
24	which additional offensive hypersonic weapon capa-

3

- 1 bilities would have strategic impact on overall con-
- 2 cepts of operation of the Department of Defense.
- 3 (c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a)
- 4 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
- 5 a classified annex.



# Offered by: Mr. Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Missile Warning Enterprise Capability

The Committee recognizes the important efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) in collaboration with the U.S Space Force (USSF) to modernize and optimize the legacy missile warning enterprise. The committee is encouraged to see the strides taken to capitalize on the use of additional orbits to further the nations missile warning capabilities, and supportive of efforts to distribute missile warning assets. The committee is also understanding of the capability the Next Generation Geosynchronous (NGG) Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) constellation has delivered and continues to deliver for our nation's security. The committee has not received details regarding how the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) contributions for missile warning will meet stated combatant commander resiliency requirements or be integrated into the overall Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) architecture. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM), to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than March 30, 2024 that includes the following analysis:

- (1) Effects to the current and projected missile warning capabilities if the planned constellation experiences program delays;
- (2) Cost incurred for ground infrastructure to fully implement the new missile warning constellation; and,
- (3) Identification, if any, of resiliency capability gaps to provide global missile warning coverage
- (4) How the PWSA will be incorporated into the ITWAA architecture to meet STRATCOM requirements

#### Offered by: Mr. Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Space Launch Protection

The committee supports the expeditious fielding of Department of Defense (DoD) tested and approved air, ground, and sea surveillance systems to enhance Space Launch Protection (SLP) efforts and prevent disruptions to U.S. Space Force (USSF) launches caused by natural causes or man-made threats. The committee understands that successful space launch depends on several factors including the security of the launch range and installation. The security of launch sites and prevention of outside interference are necessary for assured access to space.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than March 30, 2024 on the following:

- (1) Actions taken to mitigate outside interference; and,
- (2) Viable options for acquisition and fielding of DoD-approved proven -off-the shelf multi-domain and multi-mission technology, capable of tracking and targeting manned and unmanned air, ground, and surface systems.

# AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. LAMBORN OF COLORADO

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following new section:

1	SEC. 31 EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY ON ACCEPTANCE
2	OF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ACCELERATION OR
3	REMOVAL OR SECURITY OF FISSILE MATE-
4	RIALS, RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS, AND RE-
5	LATED EQUIPMENT AT VULNERABLE SITES
6	WORLDWIDE.
7	Section 3132(f) of the Ronald W. Reagan National
8	Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public
9	Law 108–375; 50 U.S.C. 2569) is amended by striking
10	paragraph (6).



#### Offered by: Rep. Nancy Mace

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Tracking of High-Altitude Surveillance Objects Report

A Chinese balloon operating at high altitude was shot down off the coast of South Carolina in February of 2023. The committee is concerned that this incident was not a one-time occurrence.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, in coordination with the Commander of U.S. Space Command, to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 1, 2024, on all foreign objects that have operated either actively or passively in United States airspace from January 2021 through the date of the briefing. This briefing shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: number of objects by country, type of objects, country of origin of objects, objects' length of time over the United States, flight path of the object, if the object had any intelligence collection capabilities, and any other information the Commanders may deem relevant. This briefing shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified portion.

### Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Commercial Weather Data and Forecasting Capabilities

The committee notes the continued development and fielding of commercial weather data and analytics by the U.S. innovation base, enabled primarily by private capital investment. The committee understands that no single technology, sensor or data set can provide all of the Department of Defense's needed improvements in weather forecasts, and many different new commercial, unclassified capabilities have the potential to support a variety of Department of Defense missions. The committee encourages the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy to utilize commercial weather data acquisition programs to the maximum extent practicable to leverage rapid innovation from the private sector. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in direct coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than December 1, 2023, on how U.S. commercial weather data and data analytics are being leveraged by the services. The briefing should address:

- (1) service plans for the evolution from pilot programs to operational purchase across all current commercial weather data programs;
- (2) how the demonstration of capability and mission utility translates to requirements for U.S. commercial weather products and data to support relevant operational mission needs;
- (3) how U.S. commercial weather products and data should be integrated into the information systems and workflows used by warfighters to ensure their timely and efficient operational use; and
- (4) what procurement and contracting mechanisms, if any, currently exist that the services and the Department can use to procure commercial weather products and weather data as a service.

#### Offered by: Mr. Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Increasing Hypersonic Testing through Collaboration with Australia

The Committee is encouraged by the longstanding collaboration between the United States and Australia, and supportive of efforts to strengthen our defense relationship via the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) agreement. The Committee notes with interest joint work by the United States and Australia pre-dating AUKUS on development of hypersonic capabilities, but is concerned that available test infrastructure in the United States is not able to keep up with the test cadence required to accelerate development of hypersonic capabilities. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, collaborating with the Director of the Test Range Management Center, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee no later than December 1, 2023 on efforts, opportunities, and challenges to expand the United States-Australia relationship to include use of Australian test faciliites, including the Woomera Range Complex. The briefing shall include the following elements:

- (1) Near-term test requirements that are delayed due to lack of available test range infrastructure, that could be addressed by utilizing Australian ranges;
- (2) Options to advance collaboration between the United States and Australia on hypersonic development, including jointly developing hypersonic capabilities and upgrading facilities;
- (3) Challenges posed by International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), export controls, or other legal measures that currently impede collaboration between the United States and Australia on hypersonic development, or that could interefere with options to expand it; and,
- (4) Recommendations on expanding collaboration between the United States and Australia on capability development and testing to address near-term hypersonic testing needs.

#### [Discussion Draft]

#### AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670

#### OFFERED BY MR. MOULTON OF MASSACHUSETTS

At the appropriate place in title I, insert the following:

- 1 SEC. 1 . PROCUREMENT OF OVER-THE-HORIZON RADAR
- 2 SYSTEMS.
- 3 (a) In General.—As soon as practicable, the Sec-
- 4 retary of the Air Force shall procure not more than six
- 5 over-the-horizon radar systems for detection of increas-
- 6 ingly complex threats that meet the requirements of the
- 7 United States Northern Command.
- 8 (b) Use of Competitive Procedures.—To the ex-
- 9 tent practicable, the Secretary shall use competitive proce-
- 10 dures for such procurement, and may use procedures other
- 11 than competitive procedures for such procurement.
- 12 (c) Notification of Use of Sole Source Con-
- 13 TRACT.—If the Secretary makes a determination to award
- 14 a sole source contract for the procurement of the first two
- 15 over-the-horizon radar systems in order to meet the re-
- 16 quirements established by the Commander of the United
- 17 States Northern Command, not later than 14 days after
- 18 making such determination, the Secretary shall submit to

- 1 the congressional defense committees a notification of
- 2 such determination, including the rationale for such deter-
- 3 mination.
- 4 (d) Subsequent Contracts.—With respect to the
- 5 procurement of the third and any subsequent over-the-ho-
- 6 rizon radar system, the Secretary shall use competitive
- 7 procedures for such procurement.



#### Offered by: Mr. Davis of North Carolina

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

[Report on National Hypersonic Test Range and Accelerator-Launched Technologies]

The committee recognizes that the ability to test critical offensive and defense hypersonic systems requires extensive range space and sophisticated evaluation capabilities. Furthermore, the committee recognizes that Alaska, particularly the Aleutian Test Range, provides a unique geographical location where air-, sea-, undersea- and land-launched hypersonic testing can be conducted without overflying populated areas and offers the Department of Defense with flexibility to meet hypersonic mission objectives. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, no later than January 1, 2024, on the feasibility of using the Aleutian Test Range as a hypersonic test range and corridor for testing long-distance hypersonic systems, and an evaluation of the application of accelerator-launched technologies for hypersonic testing.

Offered by: Mr. John Garamendi

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on the Status of the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System

The committee notes that the National Nuclear Security Administration does not have a plan to complete the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), for which activities are currently being executed as a pilot program at Los Alamos National Lab in the same facility where plutonium pit production is underway. This capability is needed to dilute and dispose of the about 43.8 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium that is in storage today. Therefore, the committee directs the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to provide to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a briefing no later than March 1, 2024 detailing the current status of the ARIES pit disassembly and processing project, including information added to and decisions taken on the program's 2022 Analysis of Alternatives, timing of future decisions about the program, and projected cost and schedule of the selected alternative or most likely alternatives.

#### Offered by: Mr. John Garamendi

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Plutonium Pit Re-use for the W-93 Warhead

The committee notes continued delays to plutonium pit production facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Savannah River, and the inability of the National Nuclear Security Administration to meet statutory deadlines established for pit production capacity by 2030. Given these delays and current plans to meet new nuclear weapon platform deliveries, the committee directs the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives no later than February 1, 2024 on the potential of plutonium pit re-use for the W-93 warhead to meet delivery timelines for the U.S. Navy's Trident D-5 program. Further, the briefing shall include details regarding any potential changes to total pit requirements currently planned for given any pit re-use in the W-93 warhead.

### Offered by: Mr. Wilson

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

High-Power Nuclear-Electric Space Propulsion

The committee notes the need for satellite power systems that have significant maneuver capability for the service life of the system and that nuclear power is a technology that adversary nations are pursuing to address this. The committee is also aware that nuclear-thermal technology offers increased asset maneuverability compared to chemical propulsion but does not generate high electrical loads, which limits the ability to host power-intensive national security systems. Recognizing that nuclear-electric power designs offer far greater propellent efficiency and electrical power than nuclear-thermal processes, the committee is concerned the Department has historically underinvested in this segment and directs the Chief Space Force Technology and Innovation Officer to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1st, 2024 describing the technical maturity, cost, benefits, and risks associated with fielding a high-power megawatt (above two megawatts) nuclear-electric power and propulsion asset in space. This report shall include a proposed technology development roadmap to scale existing power and electromagnetic thruster technology to accompany megawatt-class power levels. The roadmap shall also consider opportunities for the Department to leverage existing advanced nuclear power technologies to accelerate capability development for national security initiatives.

# AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2670 OFFERED BY MR. DESJARLAIS OF TENNESSEE

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

1	SEC. 16 INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF SPACE-BASED
2	MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.
3	(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the
4	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
5	fense, acting through the Director of the Missile Defense
6	Agency, shall seek to enter into an arrangement with an
7	appropriate federally funded research and development
8	center to update the study referred to in subsection (c).
9	(b) Elements.—The assessment conducted for pur-
10	poses of updating the study shall, at a minimum, include
11	analysis of the following matters:
12	(1) The extent to which space-based capabilities
13	would address current and evolving missile threats
14	to the United States and United States deployed
15	forces.
16	(2) The maturity levels of technologies nec-
17	essary for an operational space-based missile defense
18	capability.

1	(3) Potential options for developing, fielding,
2	operating, and sustaining a space-based missile de-
3	fense capability, including estimations of cost and
4	assessments of effectiveness for different architec-
5	tures.
6	(4) The technical risks, knowledge gaps, or
7	other challenges associated with the development
8	and operation of space-based interceptor capabilities.
9	(5) Estimated costs for developing and deploy-
10	ing such capability.
11	(6) The ability of the Department of Defense to
12	protect and defend on-orbit space-based missile de-
13	fense capabilities, including any recommendations
14	for resiliency requirements that would be needed to
15	ensure the effectiveness of such capabilities.
16	(c) Study Specified.—The study referred to in this
17	subsection is the study conducted by the federally funded
18	research and development center known as the "Institute
19	for Defense Analysis" examining the feasibility and advis-
20	ability of developing a space-based missile defense capa-
21	bility.
22	(d) Reports.—
23	(1) In general.—Not later than 270 days
24	after entering into an arrangement under subsection
25	(a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the

1	congressional defense committees a report that in-
2	cludes—
3	(A) an unaltered copy of independent as-
4	sessment completed pursuant to the arrange-
5	ment; and
6	(B) any views of the Secretary of Defense
7	with respect to such assessment.
8	(2) FORM.—The report required under para-
9	graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
10	but may include a classified annex.



#### Offered by: Mr. Moylan

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Guam Defense System - Missile Defense CONOP

The committee understands and is pleased that the Guam Defense System (GDS) recently concluded a successful System Requirements Review and is on track for a Preliminary Design Review in November of 2023. However, the committee is also concerned that U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) has yet to complete a GDS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), thereby making it difficult for the program to maintain schedule and remain on track to achieve an initial operational capability (IOC). A GDS CONOPS would include such items as confirmed warfighting requirements, threat definition, manning requirements, and other factors. Therefore, the committee encourages the Commander of USINDOPACOM to expeditiously complete a GDS CONOPS and directs the Commander to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than November 1, 2023, on the outcome of this effort.

### Offered by: Mr. Rogers

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant – Cleanup Support Facility

The Committee understands that the maintenance expenses at the Cold War Era C-100 program support facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) have become unsustainable and a new facility is desperately needed. This new facility will be needed to support current and future cleanup efforts at the site, which are estimated to take in excess of four decades. To better understand options that exist to replace the PGDP support facility, the Committee directs the Secretary of Energy provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 31, 2024 that includes an analysis of possible alternatives replace the facility. The report shall examine all possible solutions, including private financing to replace the antiquated C-100 support facility and include a cost-benefit analysis of each option as well as detailed requirements for each option including land use and conveyance.

#### Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Security Enhancements at National Nuclear Security Administration Sites

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, provides the United States Navy with nuclear propulsion fuel, and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. The NNSA has sites throughout the United States, and due to the highly sensitive nature of the Agency's mission, physical security of NNSA facilities is paramount.

The committee believes that an increased attention to security of NNSA sites is an important component of the renewed national focus on recapitalization of the United States' nuclear enterprise. The threat environment continues to evolve, and the committee understands that new technologies and systems have emerged, including advancements in unmanned aerial systems, that may enhance the Agency's ability to mitigate threats and harden its facilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2024, on physical security measures and protocols at NNSA sites. The briefing shall include:

- (1) An overview of the process for assessing physical security and determining both enterprise-wide and site-specific security requirements;
- (2) A description of measures in place to evaluate security readiness;
- (3) A discussion of the process for updating security postures to account for emerging threats; and
- (4) A description process for evaluating new technologies and innovative concepts to enhance physical security.

#### Offered by: Mr. Jackson (NC)

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2670, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Artificial Intelligence in U.S. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

The committee notes that the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly becoming a more pervasive component of warfighting capabilities. Given this, the committee seeks to better understand the Department's approach to incorporating AI in U.S. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3). Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2023, on how the Department currently incorporates AI into NC3 and any plans for doing so over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).