#### SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS EN BLOC #1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
724	1	Waltz, Michael	ISO	Army briefing on progress to ensure all units, both in special operations and conventional forces, have access to contracted data fabric integration capabilities to meet operational requirements	EB 1
745	0	Panetta, Jimmy	ISO	Directs Defense Intelligence Agency briefing on current, developing, and anticipated ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) challenges as well as current tactics, supporting technologies, techniques, policies, procedures, and requirements.	EB 1
760	1	Turner, Michael	ISO	Directs that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency make publicly available a report on threats regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction by China and Russia.	EB 1
798	0	Turner, Michael	ISO	Directs the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide an unclassified update to their 2019 Space Security Report.	EB 1
848	0	Stefanik, Elise	ISO	Requires quarterly briefings on the security environment in Afghanistan and U.S. military operations related to the security of, and threats emanating from Afghanistan.	EB 1
941	3	Banks, Jim	ISO	Briefing on foreign countries targeting employees of the Department of Defense for the purpose of committing espionage	EB 1
999	1	Larsen, Rick	ISO	Directs the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide HASC with a classified report and briefing on the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force .	EB 1
1156	0	Green, Mark E.	ISO	The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Department of Defense maintains access to a covered Category 3 subterranean training facility on a continuing basis.	EB 1
1212	0	Gallego, Ruben	ISO	Cultivates technical skills for Special Operations Forces.	EB 1
1240	0	Crow, Jason	ISO	Directs SecDef to provide a report on on biosecurity efforts across the Department of Defense.	EB 1
1265	2	Cheney, Liz	ISO	Quarterly Report on the Threat Potential of Al-Qaeda and Related Terrorist Groups under a Taliban Regime in Afghanistan.	EB 1

#### Offered by: Mr. Waltz

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### Integration of nonstandard data

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense is exploring multiple options for the nondisruptive ingestion of data from nonstandard sources and locations. This data "fabric" is created when data is created or collected from various systems and sensors.

However, such data presents issues with formatting, latency, and other obstacles to integration and exploitation. This data "fabric" is analogous to the creation of numerous "threads" that may or may not have the ability to talk to each other and be interpreted in a sensible way.

The committee is pleased that the Department, especially in the special operations community, is developing capabilities to access and analyze this data, including the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning services that are dedicated to data fabric integration to meet national security needs.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to brief the committee no later than March 2, 2022 on the progress that the Army is making in ensuring that all units, both in special operations and conventional forces, have access to contracted data fabric integration capabilities when necessary to meet operational requirements.

#### Offered by: Mr. Panetta

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance

The committee recognizes the risks presented by the proliferation of ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) technologies, particularly in the era of Great Power Competition, and commends the Department of Defense's efforts to comprehensively address the issue. The committee urges the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as the leader in providing virtual security to the Department of Defense, to prioritize and resource advanced technologies, training, tactics, and procedures that enable the intelligence community and special operation forces to counter UTS and successfully execute traditional and irregular warfare operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 4, 2022, on current, developing, and anticipated UTS challenges as well as current tactics, supporting technologies, techniques, policies, procedures, and requirements.

#### Offered by: Mr. Turner

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on Threats Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction by China and Russia

The Committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit an unclassified report to the House Armed Services Committee by March 4, 2022 containing a description of the efforts underway by China and Russia regarding chemical and biological weaponization.

#### Offered by: Mr. Turner

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on Challenges to U.S. Security in Space

The committee notes that in February 2019 the Defense Intelligence Agency published a report titled "Challenges to Security in Space" that examined the space and counterspace programs that could challenge U.S. or partner interests in the space domain. Due to the rapidly changing domain of space, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit to the House Armed Services Committee, no later than October 1, 2021, an unclassified update to the 2019 space security report.

#### Amendment to H.R. 4350 Offered by Ms. Stefanik of New York

Add at the end of subtitle B of title XII the following:

# 1 SEC. 12\_\_\_\_. QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS ON THE SECURITY EN 2 VIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND UNITED 3 STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS RELATED TO 4 THE SECURITY OF, AND THREATS EMA 5 NATING FROM, AFGHANISTAN.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, acting through the 7 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Sec-8 retary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, shall pro-9 10 vide to the congressional defense committees a quarterly briefing on the security environment in Afghanistan and 11 12 United States military operations related to the security of, and threats emanating from, Afghanistan. 13

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each quarterly briefing under subsection (a) shall including information relating to the following:

17 (1) The current security environment in Af-18 ghanistan, including the following:

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

1	(A) An assessment of foreign terrorist or-
2	ganizations operating within Afghanistan, in-
3	cluding the operations of such organizations
4	against targets inside Afghanistan and abroad.
5	(B) An assessment of Taliban operations
6	against Afghan nationals who assisted United
7	States and coalition forces since 2001.
8	(2) The disposition of United States forces in
9	the region, including the following:
10	(A) An update on United States force pos-
11	ture and basing activity in the CENTCOM area
12	of operations as such relates to Afghanistan.
13	(B) A description of capabilities of forces
14	in the region to execute operations in Afghani-
15	stan.
16	(C) Relevant updates on ability and effec-
17	tiveness of over the horizon operations in Af-
18	ghanistan.
19	(3) Relevant updates of foreign military oper-
20	ations in the region, including the following:
21	(A) An assessment of foreign military op-
22	erations in the region as such relate to Afghani-
23	stan.
24	(B) An assessment of foreign military ca-
25	pabilities to execute operations in Afghanistan.

3

(C) An assessment of foreign militaries' re lationships with the Taliban or foreign terrorist
 organizations inside Afghanistan.

4 (c) TIMING.—Each quarterly briefing under sub5 section (a) shall be conducted on date each quarter of each
6 fiscal year as agreed upon by the Chairman of the Joint
7 Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
8 the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Secu9 rity, and the congressional defense committees.

10 (d) CLASSIFICATION.—Each quarterly briefing under
11 subsection (a) shall be conducted in a classified format.

#### $\times$

#### Offered by: Mr. Jim Banks

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Secretary of Defense briefing related to influence efforts on U.S. employees by foreign governments

The Committee recognizes that foreign competitors and adversaries target for espionage employees of the Department of Defense or employees of contractors of the Department of Defense. The committee also recognizes the potential for grave damage to national security when such employees are persuaded by foreign governments to steal information, intellectual property, or maliciously access Department of Defense systems. The Department has a responsibility to inform and educate those companies and entities on the risk of employees being targeted to commit espionage. Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 2, 2022, on the Department's efforts to inform and educate entities contracting with the Department about efforts targeting employees to commit espionage.

#### **Offered by: Rick Larsen**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on China's People Liberation Army Strategic Support Force

The Committee recognizes that the People's Liberation Army has undertaken dramatic reforms over the past several years through the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF). By centralizing psychological warfare capabilities with electronic, space, and cyber capabilities, the SSF seeks to build synergies between otherwise disparate capabilities to optimize strategic information operations.

Given the imperative to prevail against our competitors in the information domain, the Committee recognizes the imperative to more fully understand the SSF. The Committee urges the Defense Intelligence Agency to prioritize collection and analysis of the PLA's SSF.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide the House Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2022, a classified report and briefing on the SSF. The report shall include an analysis of SSF doctrine and capabilities, information operations targeted at other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, SSF exercises or engagements with other countries, and multilateral efforts to share intelligence about PLA information operations targeting U.S. allies and partners.

#### AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4350 OFFERED BY MR. GREEN OF TENNESSEE

At the appropriate place in title II, insert the following new section:

### 1 SEC. 2\_\_\_\_. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO CAT 2 EGORY 3 SUBTERRANEAN TRAINING FACIL 3 ITY.

4 (a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN ACCESS.—The Sec5 retary of Defense shall ensure that the Department of De6 fense maintains access to a covered category 3 subterra7 nean training facility on a continuing basis.

8 (b) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO LEASE.—The Sec-9 retary of Defense is authorized to enter into a short-term 10 lease with a provider of a covered category 3 subterranean 11 training facility for purposes of compliance with sub-12 section (a).

(c) COVERED CATEGORY 3 SUBTERRANEAN TRAIN14 ING FACILITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term "cov15 ered category 3 subterranean training facility" means a
16 category 3 subterranean training facility that is—

17 (1) operational as of the date of the enactment18 of this Act; and

1

(2) deemed safe for use as of such date.

 $\times$ 

#### Offered by: Mr. Gallego of Arizona

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

[Cultivating Special Operations Forces Technical Skills]

Foreign adversaries are increasingly operating below the level of armed conflict, engaging in disinformation operations, cyber espionage, and economic coercion against the United States and partners and allies of the United States. The committee understands that certain niche technical skills, such as computer programming, psychological operations, and foreign language proficiency are essential to the conduct of irregular warfare. While the committee recognizes that irregular warfare is a necessary whole-of-government tradecraft in which the Department of Defense is a critical component, special operations forces (SOF) can and do - play an important role in irregular warfare. The committee believes that the United States should prioritize recruiting, enhancing, and retaining such technical skills within SOF as a means to proactively posture against malign influence.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by June 30, 2022, on a five-year strategy to identify, recruit, and retain individuals from the military services for SOF who possess an aptitude for or technical skills in computer programming, machine learning and artificial intelligence, psychological operations, threat finance, and biological engineering. As framed by the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the report shall also include:

(1) a definition and baseline of those technical skillsets deemed critical by U.S. Special Operations Command extant within the SOF formation, articulated by military service component and technical skill;

(2) a baseline of such technical skills in computer programming, machine learning and artificial intelligence, psychological operations, threat finance, and biological engineering, if distinct from assessed capabilities currently resident within the SOF formation in reporting element (1);

(3) annual recruitment targets (for each of the five years covered by the strategy) for candidates with demonstrated technical skills specified in reporting elements (1) and (2) to be selected for participation in the initial assessment and qualification programs of the special operations forces;

(4) any gaps between recruitment/retainment targets and those SOF members with the demonstrated technical skills specified in reporting elements (1) and (2);

(5) a description of any training programs used to maintain or enhance technical skills within SOF, including any non-governmental programs used;

(6) an annual plan (for each of the five years covered by the strategy) to maintain and enhance technical skills within SOF; and

(7) an annual plan (for each of the five years covered by the strategy) to retain those SOF members who have the specified technical skills.

#### Offered by: Mr. Crow

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 4350, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Defense Biosecurity Efforts**

The committee recognizes the importance of biosecurity and the potential threats posed by the proliferation of advanced gene editing technologies by state and nonstate actors. During the course of its regular operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) routinely comes into possession of personally identifiable information, biometrics, and other sensitive personal information. The committee recognizes the importance of ensuring we protect our service members' sensitive information against current and future threats posed by nefarious actors or mishandling of data. As biotechnology capabilities have become more democratized and globally accessible, the strategic importance of securing service members' genetic data has become more critical, as highlighted in a December 2019 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security stating, "Exposing sensitive genetic information to outside parties poses personal and operational risk to service members." The committee is concerned that the potential threats posed by the proliferation of advanced gene editing technologies and genetic data has become more worrisome in light of the COVID-19 global pandemic and its impact on military readiness and U.S. economic and national security. These concerns have been heightened based on the significant increase in high profile cyber-attacks and breaches that have impacted U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense, defense industrial base entities, and the impact these breaches may have on service member's genetic information. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide an unclassified report, with the option of a classified appendix, to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than June 1, 2022, on biosecurity efforts across the Department of Defense. To the extent possible, the unclassified report shall include the following:

- the degree to which the Department of Defense has assessed the biosecurity of its systems maintaining or processing service member's genetic information;
- (2) the identification of any Department of Defense or contractor breaches over the previous five years that may have exposed service member's genetic information;

- (3) an assessment of the risk posed by the proliferation of gene editing technologies;
- (4) an assessment of the risk posed by the transfer of service member's genetic data to foreign countries, including China;
- (5) the extent to which the Department of Defense provides biosecurity guidelines or standards in defense funded research and development programs;
- (6) the extent to which the Department of Defense has invested in new technologies to secure service members' genetic data.

#### AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4350 OFFERED BY MS. CHENEY OF WYOMING

At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the following:

## 1 SEC. 12\_. QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE THREAT POTEN 2 TIAL OF AL-QAEDA AND RELATED TERRORIST 3 GROUPS UNDER A TALIBAN REGIME IN AF 4 GHANISTAN.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall
6 prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional com7 mittees on a quarterly basis a report on the threat poten8 tial of Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups under a
9 Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

10 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-11 quired by subsection (a) shall include the implications of 12 Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups, including the Is-13 lamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State 14 Khurasan (ISK), and the Haqqani Network, operating 15 within a Taliban-held Afghanistan, the region, and glob-16 ally.

17 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE18 FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres19 sional committees" means—

1

2

2

(1) the congressional defense committees; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

3 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the

4 House of Representatives.

#### $\times$