

Statement by
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Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be here in the company of General O'Shaughnessy, the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Admiral Faller, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, and Kathryn Wheelbarger, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a diverse range of matters, including Homeland Defense, Cyber, Space, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mission Assurance, and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.

I would like to emphasize two key points for you today: (1) the U.S. homeland is not a sanctuary, rather, the homeland is a target in a complex global security environment in which every domain is contested; and (2) we have taken action, guided by key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by partnerships, to ensure that our nation will prevail in this security environment.

Strategic Environment

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) depicts an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by challenges to the free and open international order and the re-focusing on long-term, strategic competition. Every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. During, or preceding conflict, we can anticipate attacks against the United States homeland, including our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure. Prior to hostilities, adversaries will conduct activities below the threshold of armed conflict designed to delay, degrade, and deny action by the United States and its allies and partners. While counter-terrorism will remain a core challenge, conflicts with near-peer nations will be radically different from the wars our nation has fought since the Soviet Union's collapse.

China and Russia

China and Russia challenge United States power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode our national security and prosperity. Both Russia and China have studied the capabilities that gave the United States over-match in Desert Storm, and are building militaries to counter them, in order to dramatically reducing our advantage. The degradation of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to be a central challenge for the Department of Defense (DoD). To deter conflict and preserve peace, we must be prepared to prevail against near-peer competitors.

In its efforts to coerce the U.S., China has fielded its first aircraft carrier; developed anti-satellite capabilities; advanced its short, medium, and long-range missiles; deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles; continued development of an increasingly sophisticated integrated air and missile defense system; successfully tested hypersonic glide vehicles; modernized and expanded its nuclear capabilities; and claimed, or created, and militarized islands in the South China Sea.

As these developments indicate, wars of the future will be waged not just on the land, in the air, and at sea, but also in space and cyberspace – we must anticipate multi-dimensional attacks targeted not just against our military forces, but on critical infrastructure at home.

Additionally, the Arctic is fast becoming a front line of defense for the United States and Canada as China and Russia compete for economic and military control in the region. Defense of the U.S. homeland increasingly depends on our ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats both in and passing through the Arctic. DoD must ensure the security of U.S. Arctic interests, including open sea lanes of communications, while promoting cooperation with our competitors.

North Korea and Iran

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran pose threats to the United States, its allies, and its partners. They have demonstrated an interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as long range missile capabilities. They have also given missile capabilities to malign actors, as demonstrated by Iranian ballistic missile exports. Both are also developing cyber

capabilities to target our defense capabilities, civilian critical infrastructure, and economy. Iran continues to use state-sponsored terrorism, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

Violent Extremist Organizations

While ISIS's physical caliphate has been defeated, threats across the globe persist. Despite our successes, terrorists still actively seek to harm the United States and its citizens, its allies, and its partners. Terrorists also continue to pursue WMD, made easier by the spread of nuclear weapon technology and advanced manufacturing capabilities. The continued emergence of dangerous naturally occurring, pathogens coupled with advances in bioengineering increase the potential for, expand the variety of, ease access to biological agents, and challenge our ability to defend against them. Along with novel approaches to delivery, this increases the potential for the use of pathogens as a weapon, including by terrorists. Also, terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and other malicious non-state actors threaten us with increasingly sophisticated capabilities, including tools of mass disruption, such as cyber capabilities.

Support of Civil Authorities

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that our nation must "take steps to respond quickly to meet the needs of the American people in the event of natural disaster or attack on our homeland." The NSS also directs that "[re]establishing lawful control of our borders is a first step toward protecting the American homeland and strengthening American sovereignty." In support of the NSS, DoD is answering the call to support civil authorities: in response to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and pandemic diseases and man-made threats such as terrorism and terrorist use of WMD; to secure special events such as the State of the Union Address and the United Nations General Assembly; to protect our nation's elections against malign foreign influence; to secure our borders, and to respond to other national security threats.

Strategic Approach

In this strategic environment and with its challenges, we are not sitting idly by. Three strategies guide and synchronize our approach: the 2017 NSS, the 2018 NDS, and the 2019 National Military Strategy (NMS).

The NSS directs the U.S. Government to “protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” In support of the NSS, the NDS directs the DoD to be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland, remain the preeminent military power globally, ensure the balances of power remains in our favor, and advance an international order most conducive to our security and prosperity. The defense objectives of the NDS include: defending the U.S. homeland from attack in all domains; dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD; and preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the U.S. homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners. The NMS *operationalizes* the NDS by establishing a framework to inform force employment prioritization, force development and force design. It also explains how the joint force will maintain its advantage now and in the future and, should deterrence fail, be prepared to win.

Collectively, these National and Defense strategies emphasize the need to: enhance our ability to deter adversary aggression; strengthen and diversify our response options should deterrence fail; and pursue advanced technology development at the speed of relevance.

We Are Acting To Implement Strategy

DoD is improving its defensive capabilities. Our actions will: deny adversary benefits from aggression; impose costs on adversaries should they commit acts of aggression against the U.S. and its strategic interests; and, better protect our surge capabilities when projecting power.

Air and Missile Defense

To improve our defensive capabilities, we are investing in air and missile defense. In 2017 the President directed the fielding of an additional 20 ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Alaska; increasing the number of GBIs protecting the homeland from 44 to 64. The 2019 Missile Defense Review directs DoD to, among other things: develop a new kill vehicle for the GBI; deploy new missile tracking sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific; and, bolster U.S.

homeland defenses against cruise missile threats to the National Capital Region while examining technologies and concepts to expand this defense. The Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, is currently reevaluating Phase 3 of the Homeland Defense Design to ensure that the DoD is appropriately postured. Enhancing missile defense capabilities will strengthen our position against adversaries.

Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems

In the face of the proliferation and operation of unmanned aircraft, we appreciate the vital support of Congress for the Department's ability to protect its installations, activities, and personnel in the U.S. homeland. The Department is integrating and accelerating its research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of counter unmanned aircraft systems capabilities. In support of this effort, the Department is requesting that Congress continue to enhance the Department's authority to protect its facilities and assets from the growing threat posed by the malevolent use of unmanned aircraft in the U.S. homeland.

The Arctic

The Department is also improving its defensive posture in the approaches to North America, especially the Arctic. A joint U.S. and Canadian effort is identifying technology options that could modernize the North Warning System – the radars that provide threat warning and surveillance for the northern approaches to North America. In October 2018, DoD demonstrated use of the NDS's Dynamic Force Employment concept by deploying a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for the first time in 20 years.

Space

Space capabilities underpin the U.S. way-of-life and way-of-war. The United States faces serious and growing challenges to its freedom to operate in space. China and Russia have studied how the U.S. joint force operates and are developing, testing, and fielding counter-space capabilities to defeat U.S. and allied space capabilities. The President's National Strategy for Space directs the transformation of our space posture to expand our margin of dominance through: resilient, diverse, and defensible systems; and deterrence and warfighting capabilities. The President's 2020 Budget Request increases the Department's Space budget by more than 15

percent to \$14.1 billion. DoD is also building the organizational structures needed to fight and win in Space, including: the Space Force to organize, train, and equip joint forces; U.S. Space Command to employ joint warfighting forces; and the Space Development Agency to accelerate the fielding of advanced and needed space capabilities. The Department is also leveraging its partnerships and alliances to prepare for combined space operations.

Cyberspace

The President has given clear direction through the National Cyber Strategy and streamlined interagency decision-making processes. DoD's Defense Cyber Strategy and first-ever Cyber Posture Review chart a path forward for the Department to compete successfully with adversaries by improving response options below and above the threshold of armed conflict. The elevation of U.S. Cyber Command and the buildup of the Cyber Mission Force provide the organization and force structure to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The President's 2020 Budget Request increases DoD's cyberspace budget by more than 10 percent to \$9.6 billion to focus on implementing the 2018 Defense Cyber Strategy.

To enhance our cyber defenses, we have strengthened interagency collaboration. In particular, DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are cooperating to secure and defend the U.S. homeland from cyber threats, capitalizing on our departments' mutually reinforcing roles. The DoD, in collaboration with interagency and private financial and energy sector partners, is developing a "Pathfinder" process for real-time sharing of actionable cyber threat information. We will build on Pathfinder lessons as we expand this effort to include other critical infrastructure sectors.

The Department leveraged all of these cyber tools last year as it worked with its interagency partners to defend the 2018 U.S. midterm elections from external interference.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Against the spread of WMD, the Department is focused on: preventing proliferation globally, working with U.S. and foreign partners, and ensuring U.S. military forces are prepared to respond to WMD incidents and operate in WMD environments. In the Western Hemisphere,

we engage with U.S. and foreign partners through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort to stop trafficking of WMD and their delivery systems. As the WMD threat has evolved and increased, so too has the need to measure our success and look for process efficiencies, international partnerships, and new technologies that can improve homeland defense capabilities. In 2018, we established the Countering WMD Unity of Effort Council to: share information; improve cooperation; identify challenges and generate solutions; and inform actions consistent with the NDS and the Department's Strategy for Countering WMD. These efforts strengthen DoD's ability to detect and respond to WMD threats.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

We are working with our Federal partners, and with the public and private sectors to share threat information affecting Defense Critical Infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base. The Department's Mission Assurance Strategy identifies and prioritizes our most critical assets, evaluates their vulnerabilities, and emplaces risk mitigation measures to enhance their resilience. In particular, the Department's RESILIENT EAGLE pilot project is designed to extend the mission assurance process into the Defense Industrial Base supply chains.

Within the framework of the NDS's Global Operating Model and the NMS, we are implementing initiatives to build resilience into the Joint Force. We are ensuring our ability to flow forces within and from the U.S., a key component of overcoming adversary aggression. DoD's initiatives to reinforce homeland defense will improve resiliency, supporting U.S. national objectives and ensuring the DoD can project power during any crisis or conflict.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

DoD is better prepared to assist civil authorities to respond to threats to the homeland than at any other time in our Nation's history. We maintain this level of preparedness by continual and integrated planning, training, exercises, and real-world experience.

To that end, the Department continues to support civil authorities. In 2018, DoD responded to 154 requests for assistance. So far in 2019, DoD has responded to 25 requests for assistance, including from DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the

Department of Health and Human Services to assist with: the safety and security of special events; responding to natural disasters such as a typhoon, flooding in Nebraska, and continued assistance to DHS to secure the U.S. southern border.

In his April 4, 2018, memorandum, “Securing the Southern Border of the United States”, the President recognized that “security of the United States is imperiled by a drastic surge of illegal activity on the southern border.” The President directed the Secretary of Defense to support “the Department of Homeland Security in securing the southern border and taking other necessary actions to stop the flow of deadly drugs and other contraband, gang members and other criminals, and illegal aliens into this country”; and work with the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, to determine what other resources and actions are necessary to protect the southern border.

On February 15, 2019, the President determined that the “current situation at the southern border presents a border security and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national emergency” and “requires the use of the armed forces.” In doing so, the President invoked section 2808 of title 10, U.S. Code, and made available, according to its terms, to the Secretary of Defense the authority to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law, that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces in connection with the national emergency.

Conclusion

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee. I appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring that the Department is prepared to compete, deter, and win in every contested domain – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Driven and focused by key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by partnerships, we continue to improve our ability to defend the U.S. homeland in all domains, counter the WMD threat, and develop capabilities to defend the nation’s interests globally.

I especially thank the men and women of the DoD – military and civilian, Active, Guard, and Reserve – and their families for all that they do every day to keep our nation safe and secure.

Introduction for Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Wheelbarger

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be here in the company of General O’Shaughnessy, Admiral Faller, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Rapuano.

As the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on international security strategy and defense policy issues relating to the nations and international organizations in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. I also am responsible for oversight of security cooperation programs, and for defense policy related to the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in these regions.

It is an honor to be with you to share the Defense Department’s regional policy objectives and our perspectives on defense in the Americas. We are perhaps at an unprecedented time of cooperation and shared vision among the nations in our hemisphere. Our hemisphere is a region of great opportunity where, with a few notable exceptions, we support shared values, including the defense of democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and peace.

Although we enjoy enormous potential, we face some very real dangers. The tragedy that is occurring in Venezuela is a prime example. The corrupt Maduro regime – with support from Russia, Cuba, and China – deny Venezuelans food and medicine, and has made a once proud and prosperous country destitute. In response to this crisis, there is regional unity in support of the Venezuelan people. Most governments of the region recognize the Venezuelan National Assembly’s recognized leader, Interim President Juan Guaidó. Neighboring countries provide generous refuge to Venezuelans fleeing their country. The Lima Group has led in denouncing the dictatorship of Maduro. The U.S. Government, along with our partners, is using diplomatic, and economic means to pressure Maduro and is responding to Interim President Guaidó’s call for

humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people. We in the Department of Defense have assisted in delivering more than 120 Metric Tons of aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development in Colombia to be ready to help Venezuelans. The United States will stand with the people of Venezuela until their democracy and liberty are restored.

Venezuela is the most striking challenge to stability in the region today, but we cannot ignore other challenges. The failed models of Cuba and Nicaragua fall further behind as other countries in our hemisphere implement democratic reforms. Terrorist organizations, such as the ELN and FARC remnants that find harbor in Venezuela, and other criminal organizations, threaten Colombian citizens. Illicit trafficking corrupts societies in many countries and exacerbates violence. External actors, such as China and Russia, do not share our interest in a prosperous and peaceful region, but instead threaten sovereignty and seek undue influence over other countries' political, diplomatic, and economic decisions. Finally, natural disasters pose significant risks and devastate our region, requiring a coordinated response among all nations concerned with the suffering of the citizens of our hemisphere.

These challenges are real, and the Department of Defense takes the long view in how we, together with our regional partners, can best address them. Our vision is that this hemisphere remains a collaborative, prosperous, and secure region. It is a region where nations prefer to work with the United States, and together we advance shared interests both regionally and globally. The Department of Defense has several primary objectives for the region:

1. **Collaborating with our Partners:** Our ability to work together with our partners is paramount. In the Department of Defense, we work to deepen our relationships with our NATO and NORAD ally Canada, and with other partner nations that can and will contribute to our shared regional and global security challenges. These relationships are not limited to our traditional train and equip programs, but focus on a strategic level of cooperation. We strive for interoperability among our forces and seek to improve our abilities to share vital intelligence, increase our defense science and technology and trade cooperation, build increased capacity in cyber, and increase the complexity and frequency of our bilateral and multilateral exercises. We are stronger together, and our emphasis in this area ensures that the threats and challenges we face together can be resolved together.

2. **Addressing Great Power Competition:** The Western Hemisphere is also a region of Great Power competition. China and Russia continue their efforts to deepen influence in the Western Hemisphere through predatory economic practices, offers of security cooperation, and by propping up repressive regimes. By contrast, the United States works to gain the trust of our partners, build their capacity, and utilize our respective expertise to enhance our bilateral and multilateral operations together. We seek to share information with our partners across all domains, whether it be in the air, maritime, land, space, and cyber realms built upon a foundation of respect, collaboration, and shared desire to bolster prosperity and security throughout the Hemisphere.

The authoritarian model offered by China and Russia is one where they often seek to use economic, diplomatic, and security means to gain undue influence over the sovereign decisions of others. This model is not consistent with the values we share with our partners in the region. Yet, both have a growing Spanish language media presence that spreads misinformation about U.S. activities and intentions. Left unchecked, China and Russia's aggressive marketing of information technology and cyber cooperation creates dependencies and vulnerabilities that could limit DoD's ability to deepen cooperation with our partners and risk the security of the region's communications.

As China expands access to markets, natural resources, and port infrastructure in the region, it uses predatory economic policies to exert leverage, gain access to key infrastructure, and create extractive relationships. Chinese destabilizing influence, includes drug trafficking and illegal fishing. Chinese infrastructure investment has been pursued in ways that undermine host nation oversight and sovereignty, as well as the security and values of its people, including in its development of regional commercial and governmental telecommunications systems, the Panama Canal facilities, and the satellite facility in Argentina. China has also used its economic might to diminish international recognition of Taiwan by pressuring those Latin American countries that still recognize Taiwan.

Russia is focused on increasing its role as a provider of military training and arms sales while demonstrating military presence near the United States by deploying warships and bombers

to the region. Russia has increased support the Maduro regime at the expense of the Venezuelan people and its neighbors, sending weapons, materiel, and disinformation support. China remains a key financial backer of the region while also embedding telecommunications support and personnel that could help monitor citizens' behavior. Instead, the United States has provided hundreds of humanitarian assistance and deployed a hospital ship that treated thousands of people.

The United States will continue to pursue collaborative, transparent means to highlight the differences between U.S. engagement and that of our competitors. We will work to ensure our partners are aware of the threats to their sovereignty posed, for instance, by China's acquisition of critical infrastructure, predatory loans, and illegal fishing, or by the dependence created through security relationships with Russia.

3. **Illicit Trafficking:** The Department of Defense wants to counter illicit trafficking, which not only impacts the United States, but affects the safety, security, and prosperity of the citizens of the region. Drug cartels and criminal organizations create fear, promote corruption, increase instability, and negatively impact legitimate economies. The Department of Defense helps to counter trafficking by supporting our law enforcement agencies and providing monitoring and detection capabilities. USSOUTHCOM's Joint Inter-Agency Task Force leads a multi-national effort for interdiction operations. Our capacity building programs with partner countries contribute to this success. Beyond simply conducting maritime interdiction activities, we also improve the security of citizens in their own countries. We work closely with our colleagues from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice to promote cooperation among the militaries and law enforcement agencies of our partners. We also continue our strong emphasis on human rights training as fundamental to the basic security of citizens and the effectiveness of military and police actions.
4. **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR):** We also prioritize regional cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Natural disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and infectious disease outbreaks, affect the hemisphere on a yearly basis. We strive to respond in a unified way to address these threats and reduce human

suffering, reduce pressures on migration and associated instability, and promote military and security force interoperability for regional HA/DR operations. The Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas last year decided to promote regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation as a permanent topic for the agenda of the Conference. The Inter-American Defense Board is also playing a critical role in facilitating this cooperation. Last year's deployment of the USNS COMFORT to South and Central America exemplified strong multilateral cooperation and commitment to the region, providing much needed medical assistance to nations affected by the influx of Venezuelan refugees.

5. **Defense Institution Building:** We emphasize defense institution building as an increasingly important aspect of our efforts in the hemisphere. A pillar of the U.S. National Defense Strategy is institutional reform. Strong institutions and anti-corruption efforts are intended to make efficient use of limited budgets and sustain warfighting capabilities over time. In conducting defense institution building initiatives with our partners, we seek to share experiences and help them implement processes that magnify the effectiveness of all other aspects of our cooperation. We have defense institution building efforts underway now with Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Guatemala, at both the strategic and operational levels, and we seek to expand those efforts to a broader number of countries, given increasing demand. The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is one of the Department's lead implementers of defense institution building efforts and has fostered numerous regional and bilateral strategic policy-level discussions on this topic.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to note that we in the Department of Defense take a global view of the challenges facing the United States. We know that not only our partners, but also our competitors, watch closely how the United States faces the challenges in our hemisphere. Some actively promote a narrative of U.S. decline and disengagement. That narrative is false. The Department of Defense will sustain and sharpen our engagements with partners, gaining trust and proving our value as the partner of choice. We will build on the unique opportunities we now have, and work to build the capabilities of all partners willing and able to contribute to our shared objectives.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee.