SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee; I am here at your invitation to testify on two subjects: the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review. I am joined by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Selva.

Even in the midst of our ongoing counter-terrorism campaigns, my role is to keep the peace for one more year... one more month... one more day... giving Secretary Tillerson and our diplomats time to resolve crises through diplomatic channels. The Department of Defense does this by providing the Commander-in-Chief with military options that ensure our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.

Up front, I need to note three days from now I will visit our Nation's first Security Force Assistance Brigade in Fort Benning, Georgia as they prepare to deploy to Afghanistan. To advance the security of our nation, these troops are putting themselves in harm's way, in effect signing a blank check payable to the American people with their lives. They do so despite Congress' abrogation of its Constitutional responsibility to provide stable funding. Our military has been operating under debilitating continuing resolutions for more than 1,000 days during the past decade. These men and women hold the line for America while lacking this most fundamental Congressional support, a predictable budget.

Congress mandated this National Defense Strategy—the first one in a decade—then shut down the government the day of its release. Today, we are again operating under a disruptive continuing resolution. It is not lost on me that as I testify before you this morning, we are again on the verge of a government shutdown or, at best, another damaging continuing resolution.

I regret that without sustained, predictable appropriations, my presence here today wastes your time, because no strategy can survive without the funding necessary to resource it. We all know America can afford survival.

2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides a pathway for America's military to reclaim an era of strategic purpose, alert to the realities of a changing world and attentive to the need to protect our values and the countries that stand with us. America's military protects our way of life and our realm of ideas—not just our geography, and this is the defense strategy that will guide all of our efforts.

Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be strategic competitors. They seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models and pursue veto power over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran persist in taking outlaw actions that undermine and threaten regional and global stability. Despite our successes to date against ISIS's physical caliphate, violent extremist organizations continue to sow hatred, incite violence and murder innocents. Across the globe, democracies are taking notice.

We recognize great power competition is once again a reality. We will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorism but in our new defense strategy, great power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.

Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare—air, land, sea, space, and cyber. Under frequent continuing resolutions and sequester's budget caps, our advantages continue to shrink. The combination of rapidly changing technology, the negative impact on military readiness resulting from the longest continuous stretch of combat in our nation's history, and insufficient funding have created an overstretched and under-resourced military.

During last week's State of the Union address, President Trump said "weakness is the surest path to conflict." To those who might suggest that we should accept a year-long continuing resolution, it would mean a return to the disastrous sequestration level of funding for the military.

In a world awash in change and increasing threats, there is no room for complacency. History makes clear that no country has a pre-ordained right to victory on the battlefield.

Framed within the President Trump's National Security Strategy and aligned with the Department of State, the 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for America's military. A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.

The Department's principal priorities are long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia. Given the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, Congress must commit to both an increased and sustained investment in our capabilities.

Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.

More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space. We can challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength.

To restore our competitive military edge, the defense strategy pursues three primary lines of effort to:

- build a more lethal force,
- strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships, and
- reform the Department's business practices for performance and affordability.

Build a More Lethal Force

Everything we do must contribute to the lethality of our military. The paradox of war is that an enemy will attack a perceived weakness, so we cannot adopt a single, preclusive form of warfare. Rather, we must be able to fight across the spectrum of

combat. This means the size and composition of our force matters. The nation must field sufficient, capable forces to deter conflict. If deterrence fails, we must win. To defend our way of life, our military will embrace change while holding fast to traditional, proven attributes that make us the most formidable force on any battlefield. Those who would threaten America's experiment in democracy must know: if you threaten us, it will be your longest and worst day.

To implement this strategy, we will invest in key capabilities, recognizing we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons and equipment. Driven by this strategy, next week you will see in our FY-19 budget investments in the following: space and cyber, nuclear deterrent forces, missile defense, advanced autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and professional military education to provide our high-quality troops what they need to win. We will prioritize rebuilding readiness while modernizing our existing force.

We are also changing our forces' posture to prioritize readiness for warfighting in major combat, making us strategically predictable for our allies and operationally unpredictable for any adversary.

Increasing lethality requires us to reshape our approach to managing our outstanding workforce talent, reinvigorating our military education and honing civilian expertise. The creativity and talent of the department is our deepest wellspring of strength, and warrants greater investment.

Strengthen Traditional Alliances while Building New Partnerships

Our second line of effort is to strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships.

In the past, I fought many times, but I never fought in a solely American formation; it was always alongside foreign troops. As Winston Churchill said, "the only thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them." We are stronger when we stand together, and our military will be designed, trained and ready to fight alongside allies.

History is clear—nations with allies thrive. We inherited this approach to security and prosperity from the Greatest Generation and it has served the United States well for the last 70 years. Working by, with, and through allies who carry their fair share is a source of strength. Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have carried a disproportionate share of the global defense burden while others recovered.

Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners has enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by the more than 70 nations and international organizations participating in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, and again in the 40-some nations standing shoulder-to-shoulder in NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Most NATO allies are also increasing their defense budgets, giving credence to the value of democracies standing together.

To strengthen and work jointly with more allies, our organizations, processes, and procedures must be ally-friendly. The Department will do more than just listen to other nations' ideas—we will be willing to be persuaded by them, recognizing that not all good ideas come from the country with the most aircraft carriers. This line of effort will bolster an extended network capable of decisively meeting the challenges of our time.

Reform the Department's Business Practices for Performance and Affordability

We are reforming the business practices of the Department to provide both solvency and security, thereby gaining full benefit from every dollar spent. Every day we will earn the trust of Congress and the American people. Affordability matters and we must be good stewards of the tax dollars entrusted to us. In this regard, we will deliver our Department's full financial audit this year, because results and accountability count. This first audit in DoD's history will reveal how we can be better stewards.

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. With your critical support, we will shed outdated management and acquisition processes while adopting American industries' best practices.

Our management structure and processes are not engraved in stone. They are a means to an end—empowering the warfighter with the knowledge, equipment, and support needed to fight and win. If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I expect Service Secretaries and Agency Heads to consolidate, eliminate, or restructure to achieve the mission.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy's three primary lines of effort—building a more lethal force, strengthening traditional alliances while building new partnerships, and reforming the Department's business practices for performance and affordability—will restore our comparative military advantage, ensuring we are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of combat.

Force Application and Management

The central problem for the Department is the erosion of military advantage in key strategic regions. As a consequence, the Joint Force needs to be more lethal, adaptive, resilient, and able to fight alongside allies and partners to prevail in any conflict involving our vital interests. This requires a flexible global posture and an agile employment model that combines combat-credible forward forces competing below the level of armed conflict with flexible theater forces and surge forces that are able to deter attacks, blunt adversary attacks, and bring decisive force to bear.

Deterring or defeating great-power aggression is a fundamentally different challenge than the regional conflicts that were the basis of our planning constructs for the last 25 years. Fighting two simultaneous wars against rogue states no longer represents the most pressing challenge to American security and prosperity.

The reemergence of great powers, diffusion of technologies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require different and greater dedication of resources (Figure 1).

During day-to-day competition, the Joint Force must be ready to simultaneously:

- Defend the homeland;
- Deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack;
- Deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East;
- Degrade terrorist and weapons of mass destruction threats; and
- Defend U.S. interests below armed conflict.

During conflicts, a fully mobilized Joint Force must be ready to simultaneously:

- Defend the homeland;
- Deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack;
- Defeat aggression against the United States, its national interests, allies, or key partners by a great-power adversary;
- Deter opportunistic aggression in a second theater; and
- Disrupt imminent terrorist or non-strategic weapons of mass destruction threats to the homeland.




Figure 1. Simultaneity guidance spanning day-to-day competition and full mobilization for war.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

One of the key elements of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is to ensure America's military provides a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Last January, President Trump directed a nuclear posture review to "ensure the United States' nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies."

Following the President's direction to initiate the fourth post-Cold War review of the nation's nuclear posture, an interagency team comprised of experts from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy conducted months of analysis to develop a nuclear policy and posture suited to the contemporary security environment.

I recently received a letter from Senators concerned that the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review would "undermine decades of U.S. leadership on efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons."

To the contrary, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually reinforcing role of nuclear deterrence in a complex and dynamic security environment while underscoring continued U.S. commitment to non-proliferation, counter-nuclear terrorism, and arms control. Specifically, the review reflects the Department of Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent that will successfully:

- deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks,
- assure our allies and partners,
- respond effectively should deterrence fail, and
- hedge against future uncertainties and dangers.

I address other concerns raised in the aforementioned letter in Table 1:

<u>Concern</u>	Response
"Developing new, more useable low-yield nuclear weapons are unnecessary and destabilizing."	Low-yield nuclear deterrence weapons are not "more useable", as they are not for warfighting but to bolster deterrence—to convince Russia that the limited use of nuclear weapons in conflict is not a viable strategy.

"Your reported decision to expand the conditions under which the United States might use its nuclear weapons, including to respond to a broadened range of nun-nuclear attacks, is equally disturbing"	The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review uses the same language regarding the use of nuclear weapons as the previous 2010 review: "the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances in defense of the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners." The 2010 Nuclear Poster Review contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, chemical, and biological weapons attacks.
The costs to "modernize, sustain, and operate our existing nuclear triad" are "fiscally irresponsible"	Currently, we allocate about 3 percent of our defense budget to maintain nuclear deterrent forces, and modernization will require an additional 3.4 percent for about 10 years. Despite the cost to modernize, it remains a lot less expensive than fighting a war.
"your NPR at present hardly mentions the NPT" (Non-Proliferation Treaty)	The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states "NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime" and "the U.S. remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation, continues to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and will work to strengthen the NPT regime."
"Finally, your review reportedly pays only superficial attention to the substantial threat posed by nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation."	For effective deterrence, the U.S. will hold accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorists to obtain or employ nuclear devices. Adversaries must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an "extreme circumstance" under U.S. nuclear declaratory policy.

Table 1. Response to letter from 16 Senators expressing concern about the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review comes at a critical moment in our nation's history, for America confronts an international security situation that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War. In this environment, it is not possible to delay modernization if we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent—ensuring that our diplomats continue to speak from a position of strength on matters of war and peace.

The United States remains committed to its global leadership role to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and to fulfill existing treaty and arms control obligations. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) set a ceiling of 6,000 accountable strategic nuclear warheads. Shorter-range nuclear weapons were almost entirely eliminated from America's nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction

Treaty and the 2010 New START Treaty further lowered strategic nuclear force levels to 1,550 accountable warheads.

During this period, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile drew down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. Many hoped conditions had been set for even deeper reductions in global nuclear arsenals, and, ultimately, for their elimination, yet we must recognize that deterrence and arms control can only be achieved with a credible capability.

A review of the global nuclear situation is sobering. While Russia has reduced only the number of its accountable strategic nuclear force as agreed upon in the New START treaty, Russia is modernizing these weapons as well as other nuclear systems. Moscow advocates a theory of nuclear escalation for military conflict. China, too, is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces, pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities. It is also modernizing its conventional military to challenge U.S. military superiority. Despite universal condemnation in the United Nations, North Korea's nuclear provocations threaten regional and global peace, and Iran's nuclear ambitions remain an unresolved concern. Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a tangible threat.

As Senator McCain said last week, "since the end of the Cold War, we have let our nuclear capabilities atrophy under the false belief that the era of great power competition was over. As the new National Defense Strategy rightly acknowledges, we now face the renewed threat of competition from Russia and China—and we cannot ignore their investments in nuclear weapons in addition to conventional forces."

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the findings of previous reviews that the nuclear triad—comprised of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and nuclear submarines—is the most strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence. To remain effective, however, we must recapitalize our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrence forces, continuing a modernization program initiated during the previous Administration.




Figure 2. Development of nuclear delivery systems by competitors versus the United States.

To quote my predecessor, Secretary Carter, "we have been in a nuclear arms race for two decades now... but the U.S. hasn't been running the race," as you can see demonstrated in this chart [nuclear delivery systems]. That gives credence to my predecessor's observation. Nuclear delivery system development over the last eight years shows numerous advances by Russia, China, and North Korea versus the near absence of such activity by the United States, with competitors and adversaries' developing 34 new systems as compared to only one for the U.S.—the F-35 aircraft.

We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. This Nuclear Posture Review reflects the current, pragmatic assessment of the threats we face and the uncertainties regarding the future security environment. Given the range of potential adversaries, their capabilities and strategic objectives, this review calls for a tailored nuclear deterrent strategy and a diverse set of nuclear capabilities that provides flexibility to tailor our approach to deterring one or more potential adversaries in different circumstances. We are not expanding the role of nuclear weapons, and it remains U.S. policy to consider employing nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.

Nuclear forces, along with our conventional forces and other instruments of national power, deter aggression and preserve peace. Our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons. In no way does this approach lower the nuclear threshold. Rather, by convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, it raises that threshold.

By the time we complete the necessary modernization of these forces, the legacy systems will have served decades beyond their initial life expectancy. This review affirms the modernization programs initiated during the previous Administration to replace our nuclear ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, nuclear airlaunched cruise missiles, ICBMs, and associated nuclear command and control. Modernizing our dual-capable fighter bombers with next-generation F-35 fighter aircraft will maintain the strength of NATO's deterrence posture and maintain our ability to forward deploy nuclear weapons, should the security situation demand it.

Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of laboratories and plants is also long past due; it is vital we ensure the capability to design, produce, assess, and maintain these weapons for as long as they are required. Due to consistent underfunding, significant and sustained investments will be required over the coming decade to ensure that the National Nuclear Security Administration will be able to deliver at the rate needed to support nuclear deterrence into the 2030s and beyond.

Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter. Maintenance costs for today's nuclear deterrent are approximately three percent of the annual defense budget. Additional funding of another three to four percent, over more than a decade, will be required to replace these aging systems. This is a top priority for the Department of Defense. We are mindful of the sustained financial commitment and gratefully recognize the ongoing support of the American people and the United States Congress for this important mission.

This review rests on a bedrock truth: nuclear deterrence will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare

between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons assure and defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, furthering our non-proliferation goals and increasing global security.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital role our service members and civilians play in maintaining a safe, secure, and ready nuclear force. Without their ceaseless and often unheralded efforts, America would not possess a nuclear deterrent. At the end of the day, deterrence comes down to the men and women in uniform – in silos, in the air, and beneath the sea. To each and every one of them, I wish to express my personal respect and that of a grateful and safe Nation.

IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL INACTION

The National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review align with the President's National Security Strategy, guiding all of our efforts. As I said earlier, no strategy can survive without the necessary stable, predictable funding. Failure to modernize our military risks leaving us with a force that could dominate the last war but be irrelevant to tomorrow's security. We need Congress to lift the defense spending caps and support a budget for our military.

Let me be clear: as hard as the last 16 years of war have been, no enemy in the field has done more to harm the readiness of the U.S. military than the combined impact of the Budget Control Act's defense spending caps, worsened by operating in 10 of the last 11 years under continuing resolutions of varied and unpredictable duration.

For too long we have asked our military to carry-on stoically with a "success at any cost" attitude. Our troops work tirelessly to accomplish every mission with increasingly inadequate and misaligned resources simply because the Congress has not maintained regular order. The fact that our volunteer military has performed so well is a credit to their dedication and professionalism. We expect the men and women of our military to be faithful in their service, even when going in harm's way. We must also remain faithful to them. As Speaker Ryan said in January, "our men and women in uniform are not bargaining chips."

As Chairman Thornberry said in January, "If Congress does not come together to find a way to fund this strategy, Secretary Mattis must explicitly inform Congress and the American people of the consequences of failure."

The consequences of not providing a budget are clear. Even though we are protecting ongoing operations from CR disruptions, each increment of funding in support of our partners in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria requires a 15-day congressional notification. My commanders in the field write to me for help in getting timely and predictable funds for their efforts as they work to execute our strategy.

Additionally, should you stumble into a yearlong continuing resolution, your military will:

- <u>not</u> be able to provide pay for our troops by the end of the fiscal year,
- not recruit the 15,000 Army Soldiers and 4,000 Air Force Airmen required to fill critical manning shortfalls,
- not maintain our ships at sea with the proper balance between operations and time in port for maintenance,
- ground aircraft due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts,
- deplete the ammunition, training, and manpower required to deter war, and
- delay contracts for vital acquisition programs necessary to modernize the force.

I cannot overstate the impact to our troops' morale from all this uncertainty.

Today, as I sit here, we are engaged in prudent planning for another disruptive government shutdown.

I cannot care more about our country's defense than this Congress, for it is <u>Congress</u> alone which has the Constitutional authority to "raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain" a Navy. We need <u>Congress</u> back in the driver's seat, not in the spectator's seat of the Budget Control Act's indiscriminate and automatic cuts.

I know that in time of a major war, Congress will provide our military with what they need. But money at the time of crisis fails to deter war, and you know we would at that

point have no time to prepare, as it takes months and years to produce the munitions, training, and readiness required to fight well.

To carry out the strategy you rightly directed we develop, we need you to pass a budget now. If we are to sustain our military's primacy, we need budget predictability. I know many want to avoid additional spending, but Congress must take action now to ensure our military lethality is sufficient to defend our way of life, preserve the prosperity our country enjoys, and pass on the freedoms we enjoy to the next generation. I ask that you not let disagreements on domestic policy continue to hold our Nation's defense hostage.

General Selva will now discuss the military dimensions of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review.

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