Statement before the House Armed Services Committee

on

The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare and Key Challenges

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Mr. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Mr. Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear again before you and speak on the threats facing our country. I thank you for this opportunity to participate and address the key challenges generated by the convergence of modes of warfare represented by hybrid threats and other forms of conflict.

Our Joint forces must be ready and able to respond to challenges across the full spectrum of conflict. The U.S. defense community faces global challengers, and must devote sufficient attention to the breadth of adversaries facing it and the many different forms that human conflict can take. The first step is understanding both the range of conflicts we may face and then their changing character. Partially because of this two-part challenge, we are falling behind in our readiness for the future. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, has concluded “We’re already behind in adapting to the changed character of war today in so many ways.”

American strategic culture is sometimes criticized for an emphasis, if not myopic focus, on conventional interstate war. This emphasis was acknowledged in a major lessons learned project produced by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff which observed that a “big war” paradigm clouded our understanding and delayed the adaptation required for U.S. forces to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tendency to ignore certain types of threats or forms of conflict has impeded U.S. strategic performance in the past, and will continue to do so until we grasp the full set of conflict types. Without explicit recognition of conflict types in our strategy and doctrine, we remain in a perpetual state of reactive adaptation.

Years ago, before this Committee, I explained the origins of the so-called hybrid threat as we saw it emerging in the early years of the last decade. This threat was based on the expected convergence of irregular forces with advanced military capabilities. The mixture of these both irregular methods and conventional tools was not a new form of warfare, but the toxic addition of catastrophic terrorism and criminal behavior was expected to present unique challenges for which we were not prepared. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the evolution of ISIS over the past several years, and the ongoing bloodshed in eastern Ukraine suggest that our forecast was not too far off the mark.

1 This statement reflects only the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the positions of the Defense of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Hybrid Warfare. Nearly 15 years ago, defense analysts at the Pentagon and at the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Lab identified trends and writings about deliberate efforts to blur and blend methods of war. This forecast suggested that our prevailing technological dominance in the American-led Revolution in Military Affairs would produce a counter-revolution that would exploit the convergence of different modes of conflict. This threat hypothesis evolved into a theory about hybrid threats. Just a few years later, the projection was born out in Southern Lebanon with Hezbollah’s example, and appears to be relevant to other conflicts as well. Three U.S. Secretaries of Defense, including the current DoD leadership, found the concept useful and have cited the emergence of hybrid adversaries.

A hybrid threat reflects more than a blend of regular and irregular tactics. Over a decade ago, this mode of conflict was defined as an adversary that “simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, catastrophic terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain desired political objectives.” The convergence of criminal and “socially disruptive behavior,” along with the rise of mass terrorism was forecasted as a rising factor back in 2005. The fusion of advanced capabilities with irregular forces and tactics is key, as borne out repeatedly over the last decade from Hezbollah to Russian campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine. It is important to note that the concept is not limited to landpower, and is equally applicable to the maritime domain.

Hybrid threats can often be created by a state actor creating a proxy force. Sponsorship from a major power can generate hybrid threats more readily by the provision of advanced military capabilities to the proxy. Proxy wars, appealing to some powers as ‘warfare on the cheap’ are historically ubiquitous but chronically understudied.

The hybrid threat captures the ongoing implications of globalization, the diffusion of military-related technologies, and the information revolution. Hybrid threats are qualitatively different from less complex irregular or militia forces. They, by and large, cannot be defeated simply by Western counter-terrorism tactics or protracted counterinsurgency techniques. Hybrid threats are more lethal than irregular forces conducting simple ambushes and crude improvised explosive devices, but they are not necessarily unknown to Western forces, and may be defeated with sufficient combat power. Hezbollah’s method of fighting Israel, as evidenced by their political leader Hassan Nasrallah, is an organic response to their security dilemma that is “not a conventional army and not a guerrilla force, it is something in between.”

Events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have led European security officials to pay more attention to Russia’s assertive behavior and its ways of war. For this reason, hybrid warfare is now an explicit discussion point at NATO and among NATO civilian leaders. In the Crimea, Russia demonstrated that it had learned from its performance in Georgia in 2008 and employed inherently conventional methods, but with better agility and illegal methods. This was hardly new or “ambiguous” but it was effective under circumstances that are not easily replicated elsewhere. These are not novel, especially to Russia. These are actually time-tested methods with which the U.S. security community has seen before.
European military analysts, pushed by Russia’s example, have also embraced the hybrid evolution as a feature of contemporary conflict. Yet the NATO interpretation of hybrid warfare is much broader, depicting it as a mixture of military means with non-military tools including propaganda and cyber activity. This interpretation is much closer to the issues raised in this country by scholars and senior U.S. military officials studying what they call gray zone conflicts. The distinction between indirect gray zone conflicts and the violent methods posited by hybrid threats should be noted as a key distinction.

Hybrid warfare as a mix of methods short of war has become a common interpretation and an alternative definition in Europe, where key leaders at NATO define hybrid threats as "a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design." The NATO version reflects a combination of methods, and emphasized an integrated and purposeful design. This is a broad definition that could explain just about all wars, which usually contain combinations of military and non-military activity in an integrated plan. In the context faced by NATO today, such activities are occurring short of armed conflict. Thus, NATO’s perspective is closer conceptually to gray zone or what I call Measures Short of Armed Conflict.

The Continuum of Conflict. Understanding war as a holistic phenomenon is important, and so too is understanding the complexity and distinctions of various modes of warfare across the “continuum of conflict.” To dissipate the fog of confusion in current terminology, a heuristic construct for conflict is presented below in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Violence</th>
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Figure 1

**Measures Short of Armed Conflict.** The Joint Staff’s projected security environment forecasts a future in which adversaries will employ stratagems to gain influence and undermine U.S. interests with techniques well short of traditional armed conflict. During the Cold War, the United States faced persistent efforts to undermine order, weaken our alliances, and undercut our interests by activities that fell well short of military violence. The Soviet Union had well-established directorates in their intelligence organizations designed to sow discord, de-legitimize political opponents and weaken the resolve of the NATO alliance.

More recently, non-violent coercion measures as a form of geopolitical competition have been occurring with regularity, suggesting that this history remains relevant. China’s use of diplomatic assertions, deliberate use of fishery/maritime law enforcement forces, and aggressive seizures of disputed islands in the Pacific constitute a modern case study. China’s assertive
behaviors in the South China Sea appear designed to erode the existing international order and change the norms of international behavior through acts of latent coercion. China has used maritime militia forces to disrupt foreign survey, energy development, and commercial fishing operations and to extend and consolidate areas it views as Chinese territory with low risk of escalating to greater violence.\(^{21}\)

Chinese conceptions of “quasi-war” and the “Three Warfares” which embrace legal, psychological, and information activities short of warfare, are relevant to this discussion.\(^{22}\) Recent research suggests a convergence of China and Russian tactics is occurring, emanating from Chinese interpretations of Russia’s actions in the Crimea and in the cyber domain. We should expect Russia, in turn, to absorb lessons from the South China Sea, as well as other states.\(^{23}\)

Cold War and recent experience with the Russians suggests that the admixture of political/economic/subversive activity remains an element of their operational art.\(^{24}\) Russia uses similar tactics in Ukraine and elsewhere, a form of “simmering borscht” that seeks to extend Moscow’s sphere of influence without triggering an armed response. The Soviet Union frequently employed what it called “Active Measures” (Russian: активные мероприятия or ак тивны耶 мероприятия) in the information domain, including false stories.\(^{25}\) Russian interest and application of Active Measures does not seem to have abated, and perhaps has even been expanded via social media and fake news outlets in the last several years, particularly in Europe.\(^{26}\) Russia’s current leadership clique emerged from the state intelligence agencies and seems well-experienced in the use of covert approaches and the use of distortion, disinformation, subversion and propaganda.\(^{27}\) Much attention has recently been made of Russian meddling in U.S. electoral campaigns, but such influence efforts have routinely been part of their tradecraft for a long time.\(^{28}\) Its cyber efforts have garnered a lot of attention in Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and now in the United States.\(^{29}\) However, its interference in European political parties, and its development of soft power “false front” organizations is also noteworthy.\(^{30}\)

Belatedly, we are appreciating the need to compete with greater agility at lower levels short of war, against multi-functional or multi-dimensional threats. This gap in our understanding of the competitive space between peace and war is a shortfall in U.S. strategic culture.\(^{31}\) More recently, a defense policy scholar has noted: “By failing to understand that the space between war and peace is not an empty one – but a landscape churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention – American foreign policy risks being reduced to a reactive and tactical emphasis on the military instrument by default.”\(^{32}\)

This suggests that U.S. security or policy community does not currently recognize the importance of competing in this arena. An examination of any regional or theater commander’s engagement plans suggests this concern may be exaggerated. Theater Security Cooperation plans, military to military engagement, military aid or support, exercises and various forms of engagement are routinely employed by our regional commands to compete for influence and signal U.S. commitment. We may not coordinate these efforts well, or think of them as part of a collective competition against other major powers. But the United States does employ what is best described as the constructive instruments of traditional statecraft, as shown below in Figure 2.
Our adversaries, on the other hand, have mastered the more ambiguous and nontraditional instruments of statecraft, and have been criticized as nefarious or of questionable legitimacy. Kennan noted this decades ago when he observed that “The varieties of skullduggery which make up the repertoire of the totalitarian government are just about as unlimited as human ingenuity itself, and just about as unpleasant.” 33 While the challenge varies from region to region, we should recognize the need to orchestrate our traditional forms of statecraft, integrating the military and non-military elements, coherently as part of an integrated design.

Some Cold War scholars will recall George Kennan’s arguments for the institutionalization of Political Warfare by the United States to counter Russian activities.34 Kennan defined Political Warfare as “the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war.”35 His understanding of the problem was informed by a deep understanding of Russia and its preference for indirect methods. Covert Action (or activities) displaced the use of Political Warfare over time. Kennan himself used “Measures Short of War” in his lectures at the National War College.

This conflict mode has recently drawn renewed interest as “Gray Zone Conflicts.” These have been defined as actors “employing sequences of gradual steps to secure strategic leverage. The efforts remain below thresholds that would generate a powerful U.S. or international response, but nonetheless are forceful and deliberate, calculated to gain measurable traction over time.”36 These are admittedly not novel, but rather are more classical “salami-slicing” strategies, fortified with a range of unconventional techniques—from cyberattacks to information campaigns to energy diplomacy. One scholar goes on to list numerous current relevant examples, including eastern Ukraine. But Ukraine, particularly the fighting in Donbas, has blown past being an ambiguous no-man’s land, given the violent scope of the conflict (10,000
dead) and the overt use of advanced conventional power (armor, rockets, missiles). This definition would lump together or 80 percent of the occurrences of conflict, including all forms of irregular or proxy war.

Others argue that “The Gray Zone is characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.” These scholars note that such conflicts “involve some aggression or use of force, but in many ways their defining characteristic is ambiguity — about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.” They go on to list Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its support of separatists in Donbas, Ukraine; the advances of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); the murderous Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria, as Gray Zone Conflicts. That is a wide range of very different conflicts and asks a lot of the concept. Their inclusion of the fighting in Donbas challenges their definition, as Russia’s war inside Ukraine has resulted in nearly 7,000 deaths and tens of thousands of other casualties -- hardly covert or ambiguous. These are not gray or ambiguous acts. Several of these conflicts are more accurately described as irregular or revolutionary movements.

Thus, the definition of Gray Zone conflict remains expansive and elusive. Instead, I think the better term is Measures Short of Armed Conflict. Short of “armed conflict” puts it in the right place on the continuum and also outside of what we know and teach as war.

Comparison

The distinction between Hybrid warfare and Measures Short of Armed Conflict is important. Both use combinations. The latter seeks to gain advantage politically without the overt and explicit use of violence. Actors employing Measures Short of Armed Conflict seek to avoid violence. Hybrid threats also have combinations including the use of political warfare and narratives, but they combine it with violent force directed at both military and non-combatants.

An historical case study will illuminate the distinctions between the original usage of the concept of “hybrid threats” and its NATO interpretation. Russia’s efforts to influence Kiev’s discussions about joining the EU constitute an example of a gray zone conflict, clearly intended to interfere with Ukraine’s realignment by indirect forms of influence including corruption and disinformation. This is well short of traditional armed conflict. However, the ongoing violence in eastern Ukraine is an archetypical form of hybrid warfare within an integrated design that has produced a costly conflict. The conflict has generated nearly 10,000 dead and over 22,000 wounded.

The fusion of the various forces or means employed in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (combinations of separatists, Sestinas special forces, Russian regulars with advanced military capabilities Electronic Warfare, drones, rocket launchers, and some armor) is representative of hybrid warfare as originally defined in the United States and used by various Secretaries of Defense over the last decade. The employment of political repression, control over food supplies to control the local population, and the accidental catastrophic act of killing of 217 passengers aboard MH-17 suggest a less conventional character in the middle of the conflict.
spectrum, and all represent elements consistent with hybrid threat methods. The evidence of rampant corruption and suppression of employment and economic security evidence all the elements of a hybrid operational context within a deliberate design.\textsuperscript{42}  

The Russians under Mr. Putin’s leadership are not reinventing a new approach to warfare. What is clear is that a new generation of leaders, spawned within the KGB, are clearly applying longstanding Russian concepts of protracted conflict from the Cold War.\textsuperscript{43} Russia’s understanding of conflict constitutes a full spectrum approach, which means it can employ measures short of war or more violent hybrid approaches appropriate to the situation.\textsuperscript{44} It can also pose credible conventional combat capability, and project it at great distance, as shown several times in the Middle East. NATO’s posture in Europe was indeed dangerously close to inviting aggression in the Baltics, and Congressional actions to reassure the Alliance and enhance conventional forces in the region has averted the crossing of a violent threshold.\textsuperscript{45}  

The actions described as gray conflict or Measures Short of Armed Conflict are very significant to our security interests. This area has been highlighted by strategic assessments of the U.S. intelligence community and cannot be ignored.\textsuperscript{46} Some see the indirect approach, staying below the threshold of actual armed clashes, to be “a weapon of choice” for the future. I think this assessment holds true only for one of our major geopolitical competitors. Russia is likely to continue to employ more ambiguous and less kinetic efforts given both its past practices and its declining political, demographic and economic fortunes. China on the other hand continues to grow both in economic and military indices, and has, by its actions, expressed an inclination to alter the existing rules set and international order. While a physical confrontation is not inevitable, it appears to be a contingency that is increasingly more likely. The combination of growing conventional power and national aspirations for regional control by China’s leadership portend a higher potential for military confrontation. There will be many instances of “salami slicing tactics” in the South China Sea and cyber espionage. These may produce a shift in the region. But at the end of the day, hard power will be required to substantially reorder the balance of power and to dominate the region.\textsuperscript{47}  

Our key challenge is recognizing the competition for influence that occurs in peacetime as part of Measures Short of Armed Conflict. In both Europe and in Asia, we are competing with major revisionist powers for influence and for the retention of a rules based international order. We are also competing for the retention of the coalition network and basing structures we have used for a generation to gain access to key regions of the world for power projection. Our adversaries are using illegitimate instruments of statecraft (such as economic corruption, political intimidation, energy security threats, false front organizations and disinformation activities) to undermine our credibility, dilute the cohesion of our alliances, and prevent us from sustaining the international order and regional stability on which our economic prosperity has been based.\textsuperscript{48}  

We need to move past the lexicon debate and begin to improve our ability to counter the activities our adversaries employ to undercut our interests.\textsuperscript{49} Countering these subtle coercive techniques is the subject of new studies.\textsuperscript{48} The U.S. defense policy community and the military are now beginning to devote intellectual capital to this issue.\textsuperscript{49} But countering this method of conflict will require more than traditional military strategy responses and incorporate more than special operations forces. We need to establish or reestablish a broader framework for conflict
short of violent warfare that incorporates a wider range of tools beyond traditional tools, and Special Forces or paramilitary operations. I think we are prepared for the violence of the hybrid threat but we need to ask ourselves some harder questions about more indirect methods. For example, how do we counter manipulation of elections and efforts to sow discord via cyber intrusions and the deliberate distribution of false information? How do we ensure that forms of subversion or disinformation, here and abroad, is neutralized? Who designs and integrates our strategic approaches in Measures Short of Armed Conflict? How should we organize ourselves to address this challenge?

Conclusion

When looking back at our engagements of the last 50 years and peering forward into the future, it is safe to say that the United States will continue to face challenges across the continuum of conflict. As Professor Eliot Cohen has noted:

The wars of the twenty-first century may take many forms. Conventional conflict, including with China, most assuredly cannot be ruled out. At the other end of the spectrum, terrorism will surely continue. In between, what has been called hybrid war—blending different forms of force with subversion, sabotage, and terror will also exist.

The prevailing black and white distinctions between Traditional War and Irregular War in U.S. strategic culture make for simple boxes but the real world is not so easily categorized. Some adversaries seek to exploit the institutional and cognitive seams that these oversimplifications create. They seek combinations, both multi-domain and multi-functional, to gain an advantage. We must not underestimate them. Instead we do need to conceptually understand them and become full spectrum capable ourselves.

NOTES


33 Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-47* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 6–8. He noted that “The varieties of skullduggery which make up the repertoire of the totalitarian government are just about as unlimited as human ingenuity itself, and just about as unpleasant.”


35 For Kennan’s policy memo promoting this initiative under the auspices of the State Department, see http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm


48 For ideas about how to counter coercive activities by China in Asia, see Patrick Cronin and Andrew Sullivan, *Preserving the Rules: Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Century, March 2015).


