

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1960
OFFERED BY MR. TURNER OF OHIO

At the end of subtitle C of title XII, add the following new section:

1 **SEC. 12_. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE STATIONING OF**
2 **UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) During the past several years, over 700 kinetic
5 terror incidents have occurred in the U.S. European
6 Command (EUCOM) area of operations. Rising
7 tensions in the region due to unemployment, fiscal
8 insolvency, ethnic strife, hegemonic desires, and
9 terrorism, pose risks to the security and stability of
10 Europe.

11 (2) Arab Spring uprisings in Middle Eastern
12 and North African countries, including the Republic
13 of Mali, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Libya, and the
14 Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), have presented emerging
15 strategic challenges that present significant implications
16 for regional stability, the security of the
17 State of Israel (Israel), and the national security interests
18 of the United States and many European allies.
19

1 (3) U.S. Africa Command does not have for-
2 mally assigned Army or Marine Corps units assigned
3 to it and it continues to share Air Force and Navy
4 component commands with EUCOM. Consequently,
5 United States forces stationed in Europe have been
6 deployed to support contingencies associated with
7 the Arab Spring in North Africa.

8 (4) The Commander of U.S. European Com-
9 mand is responsible for developing operational plans
10 for the defense of Israel. Moreover, forces stationed
11 in Europe would be deployed to defend Israel in the
12 event of such a contingency.

13 (5) Regimes, including the Islamic Republic of
14 Iran and Syria, continue efforts to procure, develop,
15 and proliferate advanced ballistic missile tech-
16 nologies that pose a serious threat to United States
17 forces and installations in the theater, as well as to
18 the territory, populations, and forces of Israel and
19 European allies. United States missile defense capa-
20 bilities in Europe seek to mitigate these threats.

21 (6) Violent extremist organizations, including
22 Kongra-Gel, al Qaida, Lebanese Hizballah, and Ira-
23 nian Qods Force, may utilize Europe as an impor-
24 tant venue for recruitment, logistical support, fi-

1 nancing, and the targeting of the United States and
2 Western interests.

3 (7) Congress has lacked sufficient data to com-
4 pare the strategic benefits and the costs associated
5 with permanently stationing forces in Europe. The
6 Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found
7 that the combatant commands do not completely and
8 consistently report cost data in their theater posture
9 plans. In particular, GAO reported in February
10 2011 that EUCOM lacks comprehensive cost data in
11 its theater posture plans and therefore decision mak-
12 ers lack critical information that could be used to
13 make fully informed posture decisions. Additionally,
14 in June 2012, GAO found that the Department of
15 Defense has taken steps to align posture initiatives
16 with strategy and cost, but continues to lack com-
17 prehensive and consistent cost estimates of initia-
18 tives.

19 (8) The Department of Defense has reported
20 that the cost of permanently stationing forces in the
21 United States rather than overseas is often offset by
22 such factors as increased rotational costs.

23 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that—

1 (1) an enduring United States presence and en-
2 gagement across Europe and Eurasia provides the
3 critical access and infrastructure necessary to ac-
4 complish United States strategic priorities, expand
5 United States global reach to Europe, Eurasia, the
6 Middle East, Africa, as well as the Mediterranean
7 and Atlantic Oceans, and facilitates a rapid United
8 States response for complex contingencies;

9 (2) the United States continues to have an in-
10 terest in supporting the stability and security of Eu-
11 rope, especially in a dynamic and challenging global
12 security environment;

13 (3) forward-stationed active duty service mem-
14 bers, forward-deployed rotational units, and reserve
15 forces assigned to U.S. European Command remain
16 essential for United States planning, logistics, and
17 operations in support of U.S. Central Command,
18 U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Com-
19 mand, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
20 Strategic Command, as well as fulfilling commit-
21 ments under Article V of the North Atlantic Char-
22 ter;

23 (4) in light of the benefits associated with de-
24 fense of the homeland forward and strategic access,
25 as well as the potential for rotational deployments to

1 increase cost to the Department of Defense, the De-
2 partment of Defense should implement the rec-
3 ommendations of the Government Accountability Of-
4 fice with regard to improved cost estimation to en-
5 able informed force posture decisions prior to mak-
6 ing any further significant changes to the United
7 States force posture in Europe that could increase
8 risk for the United States; and

9 (5) the Secretary of Defense should keep Con-
10 gress fully and currently informed regarding the re-
11 quirements of the United States force posture in Eu-
12 rope and the costs associated with maintaining such
13 force.

